NGO SEMINAR ON CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

BRUSSELS, 3 - 4 DECEMBER 2007
VOICE
Voluntary organisations in Cooperation in Emergencies (VOICE) is a network representing some 90 European Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) active in humanitarian aid worldwide.

VOICE is the main NGO interlocutor with the European Union on humanitarian affairs, including emergency aid, relief, rehabilitation and disaster preparedness.

This report follows the

“NGO SEMINAR ON CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS”,

organised by VOICE and its members Care International, Norwegian Refugee Council and World Vision with the collaboration of ICVA, held in Brussels on 3-4 December 2007.

Special thanks to all people who kindly gave their input to this report.

The views expressed herein do not necessarily reflect those of all VOICE members.

VOICE, February 2008
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<tr>
<td>ACBAR</td>
<td>Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief</td>
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<td>Africom</td>
<td>Africa Command (United States Military Force in Africa)</td>
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<td>BAAG</td>
<td>British Agencies Afghanistan Group</td>
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<td>CMCS</td>
<td>Civil Military Coordination Section of UN OCHA</td>
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<td>CivMil</td>
<td>Civil-Military Relations (between civilian and military actors in humanitarian response)</td>
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<td>DG</td>
<td>Directorate General (European Commission Department)</td>
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<td>DPA</td>
<td>UN Department of Political Affairs</td>
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<td>DPKO</td>
<td>UN Department of Peace Keeping Operations</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<td>ECHO</td>
<td>European Commission Department for Humanitarian Aid</td>
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<td>ENNA</td>
<td>European Network of NGOs in Afghanistan</td>
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<td>EP</td>
<td>European Parliament</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>HA</td>
<td>Humanitarian Assistance</td>
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<td>IASC</td>
<td>Inter Agency Standing Committee (inter agency coordination for humanitarian assistance)</td>
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<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<td>ICVA</td>
<td>International Council of Voluntary Organisations</td>
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<td>IHL</td>
<td>International Humanitarian Law</td>
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<td>IM</td>
<td>Integrated Mission</td>
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<td>MFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td>MIC</td>
<td>Monitoring and Information Centre of the European Commission for the Community Mechanism for Civil Protection</td>
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<td>MCDA</td>
<td>Guidelines on the use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies</td>
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<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
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<td>MSF</td>
<td>Médecins Sans Frontières</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisation</td>
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<td>OCHA</td>
<td>UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>PMSC</td>
<td>Private Military/ Security Company</td>
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<td>PRT</td>
<td>Provincial Reconstruction Team</td>
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<td>QIP</td>
<td>Quick Impact Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>RELEX</td>
<td>European Commission Department for External Relations</td>
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<td>SCHR</td>
<td>Standing Committee on Humanitarian Response</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commission for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<td>USIP</td>
<td>United States Institute of Peace</td>
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<td>VOICE</td>
<td>Voluntary Organisations in Cooperation in Emergencies</td>
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Introduction

Humanitarian agencies are confronted by manifold challenges in their relations with different military actors, including international peace operations, state militaries and non-state armed groups. In recent years, ‘civil-military relations’ has often been neglected in European and international NGO advocacy and learning initiatives.

For NGOs, their negotiations with armed groups are often devolved to field staff, local partners and beneficiary communities. This delegation of responsibility involves complex issues of risk management and protection that are poorly understood at present. Furthermore, there are often striking gaps between agency practice on the ground and the principles articulated in humanitarian guidelines.

This seminar aimed to explore two themes: NGO policy and advocacy work on CivMil, and NGO operational strategies on CivMil at field level. Expert speakers from the field level and headquarters shared lessons learned and reflected on knowledge or other gaps relating to policy and practice. Through this it is hoped that the results of the seminar can be taken forward to promote more effective and coordinated NGO advocacy and to inform initiatives to develop improved international standards and operational guidelines on CivMil.

The concepts and content of the seminar were developed under the coordination of VOICE and in cooperation with VOICE member organizations CARE, World Vision and the Norwegian Refugee Council. This seminar also saw the inter-network collaboration of the Geneva based NGO network ICVA and the American, Washington based NGO network InterAction. The seminar was realised with the financial support of DG ECHO.

**Top Ten Expectations of participants**

1. Identify Gaps…Research?
2. Consensus message for field level use
3. CVIMIL beyond Iraq and Afghanistan
4. Learn from others’ experience
5. Translating Policy into field practice
6. Want NGOs to take the lead on CivMil
7. Common points for advocacy (Joint?)
8. Create mechanisms for sharing across communities
9. Realism regarding how NGOs have blurred lines
10. Strategies to repopulate humanitarian space
UN HUMANITARIAN CIVIL MILITARY COORDINATION (CmCoord)

DEFINITION:
The essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimise inconsistency, and when appropriate, pursue common goals. Basic strategies range from coexistence to cooperation. Coordination is a shared responsibility facilitated by liaison and common training. Among the key elements of CmCoord are: planning, information sharing and task division.

International Civil Military Coordination in Humanitarian Emergencies (UN-CmCoord) is a complex, controversial matter, which has prompted a lot of discussion. The UN Humanitarian Civil Military Coordination definition, which arose with the development of the Military and Civil Defence Asset (MCDA) guidelines for dealing with complex emergencies, changed from UN CIMIC in 2003. The term CIMIC emphasises the military, while CmCoord reflects better what OCHA is actually doing: coordination. Coordination can range from full cooperation with military, to liaison. However, the essence of the definition is that some kind of dialogue, however limited, should be maintained at all times.

UN-CMCOORD GUIDELINES - Natural, Technological, Environmental Disasters:

Oslo Guidelines: The Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief (May 1994; updated Nov. 2006 and Nov. 2007)
The Oslo guidelines were developed in 1992, and launched in 1994, before the creation of OCHA. These were reviewed in 2006 to clarify and take account of new terminology, e.g. direct and indirect assistance.

UN-CMCOORD GUIDELINES - Complex Emergencies:

It is important to point out that these were not developed by OCHA alone but with the collaboration of 51 delegations, and the process took three years.

IASC Reference Paper on Civil Military Relationships in Complex emergencies (June 2004)

Country Specific Guidelines can be a very important support to these guidelines, specifically in complex emergencies. OCHA has contributed to the drafting of these in Afghanistan, Iraq, Haiti, Sudan and Liberia through presence on the ground.

Guidelines on use of military or armed escorts for humanitarian convoys (September 2001)
This guideline was utilised by OCHA staff in Southern Lebanon in 2006, who were on the ground during three weeks of the bombing. It became clear that using armed escorts was the only way to continue working.

UN-CMCoord Officer Field Handbook (to be published). This project, in conjunction with ECHO, also entailed workshops with highly trained CivMil coordination officers and experts to compile the core elements.
PRINCIPLES FOR THE USE OF MILITARY AND CIVIL DEFENCE ASSETS

Military and Civil Defence Assets should only be considered as a last resort, in response to a request and with the consent of the affected state, whom should bear none of the cost. Furthermore, they should be used in support of local emergency management and be needs based, neutral and impartial. Personnel assisting in such missions should be unarmed and in national uniform.

Appropriate Relief Tasks Based on Missions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission of Military Humanitarian Tasks</th>
<th>Peace Support of Peace Operation</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peaceful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure Support</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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</table>
CONCLUSION

CMCoord training programmes combine humanitarian and military organisations, as having an exchange of information from people with different perspectives of the same situations improves coordination and understanding. There was recently a tailor made workshop in Afghanistan, and also in Sudan, at the request of personnel on the ground. Recent feedback from the field on guidelines suggests that there is a need for further monitoring of their implementation, also for their integration as system wide policy, and a need for a more standardised format.
BACKGROUND TO INTERACTION’S CIVMIL GUIDELINES

The most prominent component of InterAction’s recent activities has been the publication of its Guidelines for Relations between US Armed forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organisations, in July of 2007. This is the culmination of a dialogue with the US Department of Defence which has lasted between 10 and 12 years. In March 2005, InterAction members, especially those with presence on the ground, approached InterAction with the request to engage with the Department of Defence at a senior leadership level, in order to embark, on an equal footing, on a dialogue on Civil Military relations in the field. There was also an emphasis on CivMil relations from a security perspective, due to recently heightened security risks, and identity issues for humanitarian NGO personnel.

INTERACTION’S DIALOGUE WITH US MILITARY DEPARTMENTS

The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) convened a meeting with seniors from the Department of Defence, the Office of the Secretary of Defence, eight InterAction Chief Executive Officers and other NGOs. There was agreement on the need for guidelines and terms of engagement at the field level, and the issue was handed over to working level monthly meetings for about two years. The Office of the Secretary of Defence policy section, representatives from regional combatant commands, the Joint Forces Command, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the State Department, and the Bureau for Population, Refugees and Migration, all participated in this group.

GUIDELINES IN USE

The Guidelines are essentially a set of behavioural instructions for NGOs in hostile and potentially hostile environments, suggestions for the military on how they should react with respect to NGOs, and also include suggestions for communication links.

While the guidelines were developed specifically for use with InterAction member NGOs, the Department of Defence has suggested it will be used for engagement with all humanitarian NGOs. Furthermore, the guidelines will be formalised as doctrine, and with the Department of Defence reissuing a joint publication on working with NGOs and international organisations, the framework within which NGOs interact with the military will soon be much more clearly defined.

The guidelines have also been distributed to regional combatant commands, and the InterAction CivMil Working Group will try to ensure that they are referred to in problematic areas, and discuss how they are implemented, utilised, and ways in which to monitor them.

WORK OF CIVMIL WORKING GROUP

Aside from guidelines, the conversation of the Working Group is expanding, and looking at different issues, one of which will be Africa Command (Africom). This is in an attempt to develop a strengthened American presence in, and policy on Africa.

There are positive and negative aspects to this. However, Africom will not become official until 2008, so it is still possible to influence the process; to explain NGOs’ activities and methods, and the role Civil Society plays in Africa. The leadership of Africom will be using InterAction guidelines in their dealings with NGOs in Africa.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

InterAction gives lectures and trainings at various military institutes and universities, and has produced a DVD on CivMil relations. United States Institute of Peace (USIP) has released a new guide for participants in peace, stability and relief operations. InterAction works quite closely with International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) colleagues, of whom two delegates are based in Washington DC.
CHALLENGES

There are a number of challenges ahead. The US military has little awareness of activities outside of its own context, levels of dialogue or activity between European NGOs and their respective militaries, nor are they aware of EU-NATO relations, and are often unfamiliar with relevant UN bodies.

The NGO community, while very broad and diverse, needs to question itself on a number of issues, principally, the implications of close collaboration with the military, and NGOs accepting military funding and using military resources: is this appropriate and how should the NGO community react to this?

EU CIVMIL POLICY TRENDS

Joachime Nason, Coordinator Inter-Institutional Relations on Crisis Management (DG ECHO)

EUROPEAN COMMISSION COMMUNICATION ON HUMANITARIAN AID

The European Commission Communication on Humanitarian Aid (June 2007) was an initiative of the Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid, Louis Michel. Since the Tsunami, Civil Protection and Civil Military relations have become prominent issues, and especially the need to define roles, avoid overlap and optimise complementarity.

It is vital that blurring of lines and roles between humanitarian and military tasks be avoided in order to maintain the neutrality, independence and impartiality of humanitarian action (HA). In the foreseen EU mission to Chad for example, the forces to be deployed there intend to engage in CIMIC activities (CIMIC = civil military cooperation in support of the military and political objectives of the mission and to protect the force) in the sectors of health, education, and water and sanitation, as this is exactly what the humanitarians will do, this demonstrates the need for dialogue, explanation and division of tasks.

EU CONSENSUS ON HUMANITARIAN AID: CIVIL PROTECTION

While there are concerns over potential compromises civil protection may present to humanitarian actors, civil protection resources can provide significant support to HA through complementarity.

Under the articles relating to civil protection in the Consensus, civil protection assets, when deployed in a humanitarian context and at the formal request of the affected state, should be under civilian command. Under clear and well defined EU and UN coordination, the use of these resources should be needs-driven, complementary, always deployed by unarmed personnel, and coherent with HA principles and humanitarian needs analysis. The importance of the concept of last resort to the use of these resources cannot be over-emphasised. While civil protection can make a valuable contribution to HA in response to natural disasters, in complex emergencies however, it should be rather the exception. In such emergencies, HA will always have priority.

Civil protection assets incorporate state-owned assets and may include both civil and military resources, however it is important to note that the majority of civil protection assets no longer belong to the Ministry of Defence, have no military structure, while some belong to the Ministry of the Interior.

EU CONSENSUS ON HUMANITARIAN AID: MILITARY ASSETS

Under only very specific circumstances, mostly in natural disasters, may HA draw upon military assets such as logistical and infrastructure support. In such circumstances, the primary role of the affected state, the coordinating role of the UN, and the civilian nature of the humanitarian operation must be respected in order to avoid confusion of roles. Military assets must also be deployed at no cost to the affected state. In the interest of the humanitarian principles, civil-military coordination is vital; this raises the importance of civil-military officers, which were deployed during the Lebanon crisis. Military assets and capabilities can only be used in a very limited capacity, when all other civilian alternatives have been exhausted and at no cost.
COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT/ HA (NOVEMBER 2007)

In the Council Conclusions, the Council reiterates that the norms, guidelines and principles of EU HA are outlined in the HA Consensus, and that humanitarian, development and military/security actors have different but complementary mandates. The impartiality, humanity, neutrality and independence of HA can and should be protected. The effectiveness of the respective interventions can be improved by: 1) consulting humanitarian actors from the outset during the planning process and follow up of military missions; 2) ensuring coordination with humanitarian actors in the field, when military activities are needed to secure humanitarian space (deployment of civil-military coordination and liaison officers).

MILITARY SUPPORT FOR EU DISASTER RESPONSE

Again, in the wake of the Tsunami and under the initiative of the EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, two documents were developed. One document defined a general framework for the use of Member States' military or military chartered transportation assets, and the other for European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) coordination tools in support of EU disaster response. Eventual recourse to these provisions must be preceded by the identification and coordination of available assets and capabilities.

KEY PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE USE OF MILITARY ASSETS IN EU DISASTER RESPONSE:

1) To be used only in large scale emergencies;
2) The possibility exists for the Commission to request assets to complement or support DG ECHO and MIC’s activities in disaster response;
3) It is not compulsory;
4) It can be at a cost or for free;
5) OCHA will oversee general coordination and any such actions will be in accordance with the MCDA and Oslo guidelines.

NATO POLICY TRENDS

Howard Mollett, Humanitarian Policy Advisor (CARE UK)

INTRODUCTION

For NATO, civil-military relations (CivMil) have historically been defined in terms of civil-military coordination, otherwise known as ‘CIMIC’. NATO CIMIC policy is clearly defined in terms of activities which are in support of the military commander’s mission. However, as NATO’s identity has evolved to include new tasks and expeditionary operations outside of the alliance’s own region and traditional defence role, its interest in CivMil has expanded to include the concepts of ‘stabilisation’ and ‘reconstruction’.

This discussion will highlight three major trends and challenges in NATO policy of relevance to NGO policy and operations on CivMil: the so-called ‘Comprehensive Approach’ doctrine; the development of the NATO Response Force (NRF); and ISAF in Afghanistan.

THE ‘COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH’ DOCTRINE

The ‘Comprehensive Approach’ (CA) constitutes a NATO equivalent to UN discussions on integrated missions; and EU discourse on policy coherence and crisis management. While the CA terminology originated in UK doctrine, other nations use this or other terms, such as ‘Concerted Planning and Action’ in Denmark, to describe similar initiatives.

The Comprehensive Approach emerged from the recent experience of Coalition and NATO interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan. As such, at one level, it embodies lessons learned from the failings of military-dominated strategies for stabilisation and reconstruction in those contexts. If not quite ‘lessons learned’, these ‘lessons
identified', have informed the CA's emphasis on the need for effective coordination between military, political and other civilian actors. Thus conceived, it arguably reflects a progressive shift away from narrowly-defined CIMIC towards attention to a broader concept of civil-military relations. However, the concept's origin, momentum and wider trends driving the process raise significant concerns from an NGO perspective.

The CA is primarily an intra-governmental agenda. While coherence of government policy is an obvious and important objective, NGOs maintain serious concerns about potential impacts for their own independence and humanitarian space. This remains as much a critical challenge for NGOs to manage, as for policy-makers to determine. Some advocates of the Comprehensive Approach imply that it may eventually seek to incorporate NGOs also. Furthermore, at operational level in so-called ‘hot stabilisation’ contexts like Afghanistan, the reality of CA appears to threaten the space for NGOs or other agencies to deliver independent, neutral and impartial humanitarian assistance.

**NATO RESPONSE FORCE**

NATO has sought to develop the NATO Response Force (NRF) capability as part of its efforts to reform and become more agile in responding to situations ‘out-of-area’. As such, the NRF concept bares comparison - and is perceived by some as in competition with - the EU ‘battle-groups’ initiative. The NRF is described as having a potentially expansive mandate encompassing both combat operations and wider forms of ‘crisis management’, including natural disaster response. Indeed, the NRF’s first deployment was to support the Pakistan earthquake response. Feedback from field staff in Pakistan was generally positive about the NRF’s contribution during the early phases of the response. Its provision of much-needed helicopter air-lift support was appreciated given the huge need and inadequate capabilities available from other actors. However, concerns were raised about the ‘mission creep’ which occurred with NATO contingents getting involved in non-life-saving activities, including rehabilitation and other longer-term programmes, which could have been led by civilian agencies. Given the political context in Pakistan, several commentators suggested that a stricter adherence to the principle of ‘as civilian as possible, as military as necessary’ would have been preferable. The NATO deployment also became politically controversial in Pakistan; leading to the expedited withdrawal of NATO troops. To date, no surveys have been conducted to assess the implications of NATO involvement in the flood response for perceptions of INGOs, longer-term rehabilitation assistance or humanitarian space. Furthermore, despite the wider investment in ‘humanitarian reform’, policy-makers also appear deaf to proposals that donor nations might resource alternative civilian options for providing such air-lift capacity.

**INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE (ISAF) IN AFGHANISTAN**

ISAF is generally perceived as a ‘make or break’ operation for NATO. The operation has evolved since its inception from being geographically limited to the Kabul region to expand across the country. In doing so, ISAF has moved into operations and provinces that are much more volatile and challenging - including high-intensity combat - than its earlier northern geographic focus. Two factors led to the genesis of the ‘provincial reconstruction team’ (PRT) approach in Afghanistan. Firstly, a lack of political will to deploy major ground troop capabilities in most NATO and allied nations. Secondly, the wider political emphasis on a ‘light-footprint’ approach, which sought to emphasise ownership and leadership by national authorities and a minimal international involvement across the political, recovery and security spheres of activity. As such, the PRT approach reflects both political compromise and ‘best theory’ - if, arguably, not best practice - in NATO’s newly-claimed ‘stabilisation and reconstruction’ tasks. Notwithstanding efforts to promote ‘harmonisation’ across different national contingents, ISAF’s deployment to southern Afghanistan has seen the UK, Dutch, Canadian and other nations involved adopting varied approaches.

NGO engagement in CivMil in Afghanistan, at both advocacy and operational levels, has also been controversial. Reflecting the diversity of the NGO sector, practice has ranged from principled to pragmatic, to mercenary. Furthermore, many of the fundamental questions regarding civil-military interaction in Afghanistan, like the military’s involvement in development and reconstruction activities, are decided on a political level. Debates between NGOs and junior military staff and policy-makers at the working-group level have little impact on these decisions. Combined with a lack of NGO advocacy capacity focused on CivMil issues in donor political capitals, this has constrained the NGO ability to influence policy.
CHALLENGES

NGOs face manifold challenges in the direction of NATO’s CivMil policy and operations, of which two are highlighted below:

• From a practical point of view, the federal and decentralised nature of NATO operations – albeit embodying nominally more command-and-control than UN operations – makes policy-influencing a challenging and fragmented exercise. Effective advocacy on NATO operations requires a joined-up approach across NATO member nations; and linked to operational-level dialogue at field level. For this reason, until now, the NGO community has not been able to muster the capacity or coherence to engage NATO effectively on policy or operations at field level.

• The ‘Comprehensive Approach’ doctrine appears set to re-shape NATO approaches to CivMil at the alliance and the national levels. While certain aspects of CA theory appear to reflect a more progressive recognition of the need for civilian leadership and civilian capabilities in stabilisation and reconstruction tasks, that rhetoric is yet to translate into operations on the ground.

SUMMARY OF QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS FOLLOWING THE FIRST SESSION ON “TRENDS IN CIVMIL POLICY AND PRACTICE”

Key issues arising from this session addressed the role of local NGOs, local communities and intergovernmental organisations. Speakers identified points from the first session that NGOs could take forward.

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The risk of a top down culture in policy making was raised. Neither the opinions/ experiences of southern organisations, nor the reality of the field are reflected in policy formulated in Europe and the US. Africa, Asia and Latin America are not only beneficiaries, but can play a role in shaping the policies.

• InterAction is helping to facilitate dialogue between Africa Command staff and African Civil Society.

• For OCHA, working with NGOs is very important, as is the cooperation of local communities, both of whom OCHA aims to support consistently, especially for reasons of sustainability. As to regional organisations, OCHA is appointing a liaison in Addis Ababa to support and work more closely with the African Union.

• ECHO recognises the relevance of local organisations for its NGO partners. Such partnerships are key to the implementation of any operation in order to avoid a duplication of efforts. Cooperation with regional organisations needs to be further explored.

Three main points NGOs can reflect on from this session:

• There is a need for NGO cooperation and coherence, in general, but also specifically on CivMil issues. This coherence could incorporate information sharing, training and increased communication, as well as a pooling of advocacy resources, at national and international levels.

• The NGO community needs to consider its strategic positioning when it comes to advocacy and specifically its advocacy targets. For example, activities around CivMil ought to be more strategic rather than reactive.

• The NGO community needs to take account of the various state actors involved in HA and CivMil relations. The military is not the only relevant target here, but also the Ministries of Development Cooperation or Foreign Affairs, as these normally control the budgets.
A discussion paper was commissioned prior to the seminar in order to give a broad overview of current thinking in CivMil policy and to stimulate the debate. Raj Rana, the consultant who prepared the paper, was present at the seminar to present the main themes of the paper.

INTRODUCTION

Over the last 15 years, there have been various comprehensive efforts to better chart out the ‘rules of the game’ as concerns the interaction, coordination and cohabitation of military and civilian actors responding to natural disasters, conflict and complex emergencies. The military, in particular, has benefited from a significant investment in developing new doctrine and policy, complemented by training at national and regional levels. Humanitarian actors and research institutes have also contributed to this evolution, though the investment and engagement has tended to be inconsistent and often lacking coherence. Over the past decade, the result of efforts at all levels has been a wide range of CivMil policy documents available in the public domain.

The discussion paper is organised in two parts. Part 1 is a broad strokes view of the key CivMil issues that NGOs face. Following an examination of NGO CivMil policies, and on the evolution of armed forces and their doctrine, this section then examines the issues through different lenses. These perspectives include the NGO advocacy efforts, the challenge of integrated missions, the links between CivMil and humanitarian principles and security and, finally, the role of donors in CivMil.

Part 2 is a comprehensive overview of existing CivMil policy and guidance. It is more academic in nature and drills down into existing policies and sketches a comprehensive view of the types of policies, their frameworks, the types and forms of collaboration they propose and the types of commonality, contradictions and gaps that emerge.

In its development of this initiative, VOICE outlined the current status of NGO policy/advocacy and learning initiatives on CivMil:

- General neglect of CivMil issues within NGO humanitarian advocacy
- Limited and highly varied NGO advocacy on CivMil at national level across the EU, and at other European and international levels.
- Lack of rigorous evidence base to substantiate NGO advocacy on humanitarian space and concerns regarding ‘blurring the lines’.
- Lack of sharing of lessons learned from NGO CivMil operational strategies at all levels, from the field staff to NGO headquarters in donor countries to international/policy-maker levels.

The research largely confirmed the validity of these perspectives. The key points that come out of this study include:

Specialised and not mainstreamed issue

There is no end to new policy and academic analysis of CivMil, which underscores that it has become a specialised niche, albeit one that is poorly resourced in the NGO world. CivMil discussion is thus between policy makers and not senior managers, which might exclude the issue from becoming more prominent.
No lack of CivMil policy or guidance
Respondents had their own CivMil policy, employed the guidelines of others, or were in the midst of developing their own. There was concern that CivMil policies were no longer relevant to the realities found in the field, and that field staff were perhaps too willing to compromise/accommodate in order to continue their operations. While humanitarian principles inform and guide all existing CivMil policies, the fear is that political imperatives are obliging a large cross-section of NGOs to align themselves with the competitive realities in which they operate.

Old recipes for a new world
Interviewees maintain their CivMil positions of ‘principled pragmatism’ with conviction. As states, armed forces and inter-governmental organisations move on to new concepts of disaster and crisis response, and the term ‘humanitarian’ is used to accommodate an increasingly broad range of definitions, it is of little surprise that NGOs find themselves ‘outgunned’. Whatever the validity of existing principles, civilian humanitarian actors are considered as reading from a 1990’s script. The key emerging issue was that with an increasingly pluralist NGO community, there are many organisations who are silent on the CivMil issue, with even the largest actors seemingly unable, or unwilling, to state their position.

Challenge at home, or challenge in the field?
Discussion was centred on the CivMil advocacy challenges at the headquarters level, where NGOs are engaged on an ad hoc basis in attempting to have the NGO perspective respected in the shift of states towards integrated/comprehensive/joined-up approaches. The observed trend was for NGO CivMil advocacy to address audiences at tactical and operational levels, but little concerted, collaborative effort at strategic national and regional levels.

‘It’s too complicated’
In broad terms, respondents agree that CivMil is a vital topic for NGOs to master. Yet, it is one amongst a myriad of other challenges that NGOs face, and one that demands significant investment to mainstream, and advance internal debate. Lacking better anchoring in the broader humanitarian debate, and more coordinated NGO efforts, there is a looming risk of ‘lost opportunities’. NGOs need to reconsider how they define and deliver their CivMil message to key stakeholders, taking into account the changing views, conceptions and priorities of their audiences and the environment in which they operate, at home, and in the field.

RESULTS OF WORKING GROUP ON “TRENDS IN CIVMIL POLICY AND PRACTICE”

Following the first session of the seminar, participants broke into three groups to discuss trends in CivMil Policy and Practice from the following perspectives:

- recent positive developments in policy around NGOs and CivMil;
- challenges to NGOs;
- priority issues for NGOs and how these priorities can be best addressed (from an advocacy, research and training point of view).

The objective of the working groups was to identify policy issues that could be addressed through joint NGO efforts (e.g. advocacy, learning, training, research, dialogue etc…).

Each group focused mainly on US/NATO, EU or UN according to their expertise. The below table outlines the results of the working groups as reported during feedback to the plenary.
| What are key positive developments within the policy environment? | In the Office of Military Affairs space to talk between the 6 different “combat and command liaison officers” OFDA teams aware of humanitarian principles (are often ex aid workers) USAID has full-time liaison person in each Combat and Command structure so act as good entry points | Many initiatives over last 6 months for example the European Commission Communication on Humanitarian Aid, and the recently signed European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid | Integrated Mission (IM) has strengthened the protection of civilians (physical, legal and social protection) OCHA aware of challenges of IM and looking to NGOs for support IMs and CivMil issue more joined up than previously |
| What are the critical challenges of these policies? | Different NGO responses to assistance activities of military ‘Hostile’ or ‘complex’ environment and the implications of this language Should InterAction be left alone to interact with US military? Should we always be critical if IHL specifies a role for the military? Military involvement/ level of awareness of reconstruction and development issues Private sector used by military and donor governments to implement assistance work AFRICOM: Our governments should be wary of appearing as neo-colonialists | Implementing the new European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid will be a challenge EU Member States interpret Humanitarian Principles, Civil Protection and the EU Consensus document very differently (e.g. some member states deploying for Chad see themselves as neutral Humanitarians) Lack of coherence within Member States on which ministry/department deals with humanitarian operations | NGOs involved in the protection of civilians find it harder to maintain independence in Integrated Missions There is inconsistency in NGO positioning and a huge gap between knowledge and awareness at field and international levels How to stick to humanitarian principles? Not good enough info exchange OCHA-NGOs How to remain involved in debates whilst not compromising independence? |
| What should be the priority issues for NGOs with regard to the UN/EU/NATO, and how can these be best addressed? | Should advocate to other actors beyond military (e.g. civil servants in other Government departments) InterAction will work with military on use of language and concepts Advocacy should be evidence-based and context-based AFRICOM roll-out should be guided by joint NGO position (e.g. common statement) | NGOs need clearer and more consistent voice Pool NGO resources for CivMil advocacy and ensure representation at key decision-making fora EC will develop Action Plan for implementation of Consensus document. NGOs need to be involved in the implementation Advocate that each Member State identifies one lead ministry for emergencies and considers where CivMil should be placed | Better monitoring - Have IMs improved humanitarian outcomes? Protection: more than a legal issue NGOs need more common voice and common messages NGOs need to improve communication of HQ policies to field staff NGOs need to assign staff on CivMil. Should CivMil become a horizontal issue rather than being dealt with by specialists? |
BACKGROUND TO ACBAR’S CIVMIL ADVOCACY

Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief, ACBAR was founded in 1988 and has 94 members; 63 international 31 national members. Advocacy on civil military relations started in 2002 when ideas and plans for Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) were formulated. Early CivMil advocacy addressed PRTs, their security implications, and the concerns of Afghanistan NGOs. The PRTs are headed by coalition nations and almost all NATO nations have a PRT in Afghanistan. In the first two years of ACBAR’s advocacy there was a dedicated policy expert.

ADVOCACY ACTIVITIES

United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) hosts an NGO CivMil coordination body which ACBAR chairs, with NGOs, agencies and military partners in attendance. NGO participation is low, with five NGOs consistently in attendance. Considering the ACBAR membership of 94, and the NGO presence in Afghanistan which is about 1200, this is quite poor. Despite this, ACBAR wants the meetings to be as representative as possible. There are so many different positions among NGOs on the CivMil issue, whether on PRTs or CIMIC, which can be challenging. Better coordination is considered by some to be the main concern. However, this is not the only issue, and different opinions, points of view and reactions to the situation in Afghanistan have to be acknowledged. Positions have been shifting, whether against PRTs, in favour of working directly or indirectly with PRTs, or lobbying for more development activities of PRTs, to show populations in home countries that PRTs can really benefit the Afghanistan population. ACBAR can only broadly paint the different positions, while acknowledging the diversity of NGOs.

CIVMIL GUIDELINES FOR NGOS WORKING IN AFGHANISTAN

There is an understanding at both field and HQ levels that the existing policies and guidelines are good in theory but are not widely used on the ground. ACBAR, along with an Oxfam policy expert, is in the process of developing Afghanistan specific CivMil guidelines, which include different policy and guidelines already in existence. It is a living document which should be treated as guidelines and not as a legally binding document, not only because of NGOs’ different positions but because of the diversity in the NGO community.

CHALLENGES

If ACBAR, and the NGO community more widely, want their advocacy to have an effect, different opinions have to be acknowledged, without labelling them good or bad. Secondly, NGOs have to communicate their awareness of their different positions. The military is aware of this, as they find NGOs who are willing to cooperate more closely with them. NGOs should not project an image of harmony that does not exist.

Positions are also shifting on discussions on humanitarian space. Some NGOs think humanitarian space is lost already and prefer to use the term operational space. There may be humanitarian space but it is very crowded. The humanitarian community needs to regain humanitarian space, and someone to lead the debate on it, while questioning its motives in so doing: Do we want it back because it belongs to us or because it is for the beneficiaries? At the end of the day it is about the beneficiaries and not about humanitarian actors.

CONCLUSION

There is an Afghan saying, that if you want an apple you don’t care if it comes from the apple or the pear tree, so maybe this should be kept in mind in our discussions. Once the Afghan population receive what is necessary, its origin is not important, regardless of the donor’s agenda or motivations. NGOs need to reflect on whose behalf this discussion is taking place.
INTRODUCTION
From Norwegian Refugee Council’s (NRC) point of view, the existing guidelines are relevant and provide a good framework, however their applicability and knowledge in the field is questionable, as has been noted by some participants. How many staff have read, understood and been trained on the various guidelines? Complexity of the guidelines and a lack of resources have been offered as different reasons for lack of awareness. The guidelines are relevant but now staff need to address the Headquarters of their agencies if they want to really be a knowledgeable and relevant agency working within this field. There is still quite a way to go to anchor CivMil among humanitarian agencies and across networks.

EXAMPLE OF GUIDELINES AT FIELD LEVEL: DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (DRC)
Guidelines have been developed at country levels, for example the NRC office in DRC, which works mostly in the east but is also present in Kinshasa. While there exists a certain level of awareness, knowledge of the guidelines this is very inconsistent. There is an important difference between understanding guidelines, and applying them to advocacy and operational work.

CONTEXTUAL SPECIFICITIES
The understanding and implementation of guidelines is also very different from region to region. To take DRC as an example, there are very different discussions in the east and in Kinshasa. This comes down to personal knowledge and the interest of the organisations and the military commanders; some will take an interest and try to transmit and apply information, while others are not aware of it. There are very different interpretations of these guidelines, but there are also many operational challenges. Deployment times for the military are shorter, the overall working environment is complicated, and contextual and technical knowledge is not deep due to staff turnover.

INTERACTION WITH MONUC
There has been an attempt to create a platform with United Nations Mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) at a relatively high level, with generals and country directors. This is an opportunity for NGO directors to influence MONUC, however some have chosen not to engage with MONUC. MONUC has not been a part of negotiations with neighbouring countries about the future peace agreement and information about mandates and NGOs within MONUC is not a priority. This poses a challenge for NGOs.

CHALLENGES
• Another example of a challenge is the protection of civilians; the military interpretation of protection is very different from that of NGOs and the humanitarian community. In eastern Congo the MONUC Civil Affairs Section is co-chairing the cluster on protection, which poses a challenge with the integrated mission of the UN in DRC. It also differs with the context as violence escalates or decreases in Congo and this influences how we relate to the military.
• Our challenges are with our colleagues in the field and with the military, we need to engage with and talk to the military to promote mutual understanding of one another’s motivations, positions and plans.
• That CivMil is very much anchored in the advocacy and policy sphere rather than with management is a point that needs further attention. Further to this, there can sometimes be tension between field and HQ especially on advocacy issues and a perception maybe that it is not relevant to field staff. There needs to be a balance between operational, advocacy and managerial sides.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The political imperative is as important as the military focus. It is just as relevant to focus on politicians as on the military, as this is where the budgets are being planned and where the pressure comes from, this has been somehow overlooked in focusing on the military. This is a complex balance; politicians will want to act upon public pressure. The public, in their concern for action to be taken, attach no import as to whether this action is carried out by military staff in uniforms or not. NGOs are sometimes perceived to be those who are resisting assistance to the field. NGOs need to understand the power media coverage of conflicts has on the public, and the consequent pressure on governments to react. This is a challenge NGOs must respond to.

Hopefully there will be more clarity on the gaps in resources and that NGOs are able to talk openly about this. However, CivMil is not the only issue that lacks resources. Resources might be used more collectively among networks, anchoring CivMil within management and trainings, which can also be done across organisations.

FIELD BASED EXPERIENCE OF MSF BELGIUM AND UN CIVMIL SYSTEM INTERACTION IN HAITI 2005

The UN and US have responded to political instability in Haiti with the suspension of foreign aid, intimidation and military intervention. Political unrest and subsequent violence in 2004, prompted the creation of the UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), composed of 9000 troops, 1600 political, and 1000 civilian staff. MSF experienced 6000 admissions for violence related injuries, among which 3000 were gunshot wounds, and 2000 stabbings between January and December 2007, illustrating the levels of turbulence in the country.

The UN Integrated Mission operating in Haiti is an “integrated structure” with an “integrated agenda”; with the political, military and humanitarian branches responsible to a special branch of the UN Secretary General. The Humanitarian and Development Coordination unit is peculiar to MINUSTAH, while the UN country team agency is not officially under the mission command.

In terms of a humanitarian agenda there does not seem to be a specific policy for the provision of military assistance, or at least not a policy that goes beyond single engagement. Moreover, the mission is not welcome at all by the population.

CHALLENGES

Imposition of the Security Agenda
With the integration of different aspects of interventions and the submission of UN agencies to MINUSTAH, the priorities of the security agenda are largely imposed on the agencies, diminishing their humanitarian space and their ability to clearly identify needs. A red-zone declared by the UN in Port au Prince for a brief period in 2005 restricted access for humanitarian agencies, including relevant UN agencies. Agencies feel safer working with the ICRC rather than MINUSTAH in these areas, given the latter’s distance from the operations. Using armed escorts is considered more dangerous than not.

Negative perceptions of MINUSTAH
In Haiti there are 900 4x4 vehicles with the UN symbol, organisations believe that the main step they can take to disassociate themselves from MINUSTAH is to use their agency car and not the UN logo.

Loss of impartiality
There is a politicisation of aid and manipulation of the situation. As for example with the decision to allocate CERF money, there are other agendas apart from humanitarian needs, but these should not drive the funding agenda. In some areas where there is a lot of violence there is a justifiably strong military
presence, but in a country which is completely “failed”, and facing multiple political, humanitarian and socio-economic problems, the biggest investments do not always correspond to the greatest need.

**Mixture of political, military and relief agenda**

Following violent clashes, and in the resultant state of emergency declared by MINUSTAH, agencies are required to provide relief. However, there is often personnel at the heads of agencies who have never taken part in humanitarian relief before. In an immunisation programme in Cité Soleil, there was disagreement between the UN Head of Mission, MSF and another humanitarian NGO on the ground over the correct treatment to be used, or indeed if it was even the correct course of action. This demonstrates the intermingling of priorities and agendas in such a situation.

**EFFECTS OF INTEGRATION OF NGOS WITH MINUSTAH**

Lack of transparency, insufficient communication with NGOs, too much time spent on internal organisation, ignorance of field reality in Haiti have all been raised as issues of concern. The lack of institutional memory and a lack of understanding of context have been cited as main NGO opinions of the MINUSTAH mission in Haiti. Furthermore, MINUSTAH may have jeopardised the fragile link UN agencies used to have with the Haitian population.

**CONCLUSION**

The approach of MSF was, not to avoid relations with the military, but for the very first time, to try to play a prevention role. Through meetings with battalions, MSF worked to raise their awareness of the humanitarian principles of impartiality, neutrality and independence crucial to HA. In the end it was a successful dialogue.

Finally, MSF does not feel that humanitarian space has been lessened by the Integrated Mission, but fear that this may be the reality very soon. Therefore MSF should be more proactive in promoting their principles, values and character, and their distance from MINUSTAH.

**SUMMARY OF QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS FOLLOWING THE SECOND SESSION “NGO OPERATIONAL STRATEGIES”**

The question and discussion session concerned the effectiveness and reality of implementing existing, and potential guidelines, and also the value of guidelines drafted at field level. The issue of Private Security and Military Companies (PMSCs) was also addressed.

- There was concern over the ability and capacity to actually follow up on and implement guidelines, as well as monitoring and updating them. Guidelines developed at field level, and therefore more contextually relevant, stand a better chance of implementation.
- It was also suggested that examples of best practices, operational and coordination mechanisms, and strategies of NGOs should be included in the planning and design of guidelines.
- Guidelines have normally been developed following an incident or in response to the need for coherence on a certain issue. The value of guidelines prepared in advance was supported by participants. However, regardless of the amount of time and effort it takes to develop guidelines, it must be remembered that in a complex situation, actions will be determined by strategic necessity.
- Most frontline staff are local, and staff at HQ have an unsophisticated appreciation of their dynamics and can not translate them into policy. Field staff in Somalia perceives CivMil to be protection and would like to see flak jackets and basic military training for NGO staff as an outcome of CivMil reform.
- Regarding the military side, the heterogeneity of this must be acknowledged. There is a lack of a strategic and coordinated approach within NATO on how to deal with NGOs, and this is an extra challenge. Furthermore, PMSCs are becoming increasingly widespread, they employ a lot of staff, many of whom are ex-military, and NGOs need to begin thinking about how they will interact with this group.
The objective of the working group was to identify practical issues that could be addressed through joint NGO efforts. Participants broke into three groups to discuss trends on NGO operational strategies from the following perspectives:

What are the implications of different positions that NGOs take in the field?
- Examples of good practices at field level
- Examples of challenges in “operationalising” international policy guidelines at the field level
- What should be the priority issues/ questions for NGOs

### Examples of good practices at field level

- Can we define ‘good practice’?
- A Code of Conduct is a good basis for most NGOs
- East Timor is the only example of good practice! Good use was made of agreed basic principles
- Dialogue within NGO CivMil Working Group in Afghanistan
- UNMIL (Liberia): OCHA’s integration within Integrated Mission was challenged and concerns understood (for future deployments)
- The process of developing national guidelines is as important as content
- Sharing security information across humanitarian actors
- Transparency and information sharing with warring parties with no hidden agenda - including on principles
- International guidelines are followed at field level and feedback needs to be captured to improve them

### Examples of challenges in “operationalising” international policy guidelines at the field level

- Protection is mainly the mandate of ICRC and UNHCR (as well as States!). NGOs need to be more humble about what they can offer
- There is a need for lessons-learned from the implementation of policy guidelines in different contexts (Sierra Leone positive example, DRC negative example)
- Many organisations have different interpretations of guidelines
- NGOs are holding back the process and won’t be taken seriously unless they develop a more consensual approach
- The risk of politicisation of aid is very real, especially when DPKO funds from CERF are used for non-humanitarian programmes
- Security and access to populations are closely linked. Perception of local population about NGOs is critical, there is a need for more evidence of how local perceptions are influenced
- CivMil not integrated enough within programme management
- UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) approach on security can be problematic for NGOs not wishing to operate on that basis, but there are implications, for example for coordination with UN on evacuation
- Increasing acceptance of the role of international military in natural disasters, and NGOs losing position…
What should be the priority issues/questions for NGOs?

➔ Codes of Conduct to be developed in each context and adapt International Guidelines accordingly
➔ Humanitarian principles should remain the primary focus and consider how different development/humanitarian strategies affect each other
➔ Develop basic operating guidelines
➔ Guidelines need to be made more accessible for the field, preferably in collaboration with field staff
➔ Can use existing policies to generate Minimum Standards as a starting point for further consensus building on complex CIVMIL issues. Wish to prioritise beneficiaries and staff safety within these guidelines.

Need greater consistency on advocacy:

➔ Within networks (especially across field and HQ divide) and based on field experience
➔ Advocacy at field and HQ levels have different purposes: at field, need to draw out experiences and evidence; at HQ can use advocacy for broader concerns (e.g. securitisation of aid)
➔ Dilemma in trying to maintain a consistent position whilst allowing for differences between organisations/networks
➔ Context-specific (need to support national staff in conducting context analyses and engage more with local actors)
➔ NGOs need to plan better including pre-deployment training with military to mitigate timing crises in the field
➔ Pooling resources to address problem of capacity gaps within individual agencies
➔ Leadership needs to think beyond NGO ‘box’ and help translate policies into field practice and close gap between HQ/field decision making (e.g. using positive case studies to build field staff capacity on processes and mechanisms for coordination)
➔ Internal and external accountability on CivMil practice - can we create mechanisms within existing coalitions?
➔ It is important to follow dynamics of each context (Natural disasters in Pakistan, Indonesia and Sri Lanka)
➔ Common responsibility of NGOs to respect impartiality, no matter which group of the population is affected
➔ Need to invest to improve NGOs perception with local communities
➔ Scope to increase inter-agency sharing of learning
PART THREE: NGO ADVOCACY STRATEGIES AND WAYS FORWARD

INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND DAY: SUMMARY OF MAIN POINTS AND POSSIBLE ACTION POINTS IDENTIFIED FROM THE FIRST DAY

Following the first days’ session of presentation and discussions, the seminar facilitator drafted a paper summarising the most prominent points and potential avenues for action identified during these sessions.

EXPLORED EXTERNAL POLICY ENVIRONMENT

This is a time of real change, especially within the EU (Consensus Document + others), USA (birth of Africom) and UN (OCHA’s positioning (under John Holmes) with respect to Integrated Missions; (Humanitarian Reform omits CivMil). These developments offer real opportunities for NGO influencing.

But:

- There is a recurring sense that NGOs need to get their collective house in order:
  - Common/shared messages;
  - Better communications (internally and externally, including to donor publics);
  - Observance of humanitarian principles (impartiality was specifically mentioned);
  - Pooling resources to overcome capacity gaps of individual agencies (with implications for NGO networks/umbrella groups at national/international levels);
  - Anchoring CivMil concerns with management as well as advocacy/policy personnel;
  - Having staff dedicated to CivMil work;
  - Pitching to political wings of government as well as military;
  - Practicing what we preach (guidelines as well as principles);
  - Bridging HQ/field … policy/practice gap (gaping hole).

CRITICAL ENABLERS

Evidence from field: what works what doesn't; impact on local population;

- Involvement of national groups and civil society on CivMil at national and international levels;
- Relationship with, and role of, OCHA;
- Resources and willingness within NGOs to engage more proactively/strategically (regain leadership).

POSSIBLE HOOKS

**EU Policy Developments:** e.g. the role of NGOs in implementation of Consensus Document? Links with Member States to influence their understanding/implementation of it; instrumentalisation of aid (politically driven agenda).

**Relationship with UN:** In particular Integrated Missions: monitor effectiveness; contribution to protection of civilians; role of OCHA; limits of integration at different levels (c/f comprehensive approach debates); instrumentalisation of Aid (politically driven agenda); CivMil in Humanitarian Reforms.

**NGO coherence:** identify core commonalities and write these up succinctly (do we draw on MCDA guidelines and therefore promote them?); contextualise at field level with national groups; translate; minimum standards on CivMil; internal learning for improved consistency (within and across NGOs).

Can issue of whether to accept funding from military (e.g. PRTs, Africom etc.) be addressed collectively or not?

**Security… Use of armed escorts…. Perception of NGOs:** implications of UNDSS and security coordination mechanism; staff safety; we need to invest in shaping NGO perceptions at field level; learn lessons from e.g. Chad and Uganda on use of armed escorts; develop clearer criteria?

**AFRICOM:** new, open to influence, avoidance of it becoming new model for donors (EU?). Can we develop a joint position that includes African civil society groups?

**Information:** need to improve sharing within NGOs and NGO community as well as with others (e.g. OCHA) - but how? Introverted policy contexts (EU, UN, NATO, USA) so need to cross these (and across Atlantic, and across HQ/field; and across diversity of NGOs).
In early developments of CivMil relations we witnessed the mixing of the political and military efforts for the management or resolution of conflicts and this continued into the 90s. Increasingly, armed forces were given tasks normally considered civilian by their respective politicians. The initial response was somewhat reluctant but militaries responded to their new responsibilities by adapting their doctrine, and analysing in broad terms their relevant field experiences gained in different scenarios. This new scope can be contextualised in a three block warfare theory, in which military reaction will be a mix of HA, peacekeeping and combat. In addition, this new scope of military reaction prompted the ICRC to review its dialogue in relation to armed forces. If today, conflict environments remain very diverse in terms of roots, nature and characteristics, at a more global level we can see a trend of more polarised and radicalised confrontation, and a general tendency for a state or a coalition of states opposed to a number of non-state actors. In some contexts it is very fragmented, e.g. in Sudan, groups are emerging almost every month and are using non-conventional forms of violence; this includes deliberate attacks on civilian populations and attacks on humanitarian organisations.

Another characteristic is the parties to a conflict expect all stakeholders to the conflict, including humanitarians, to take sides. In the eyes of warring parties one is friend or foe, which makes a situation very difficult for HA organisations in terms of neutrality and independence.

Today the challenge for the ICRC and for NGOs is to maintain and enhance acceptance for its Neutral and Independent Humanitarian Action, and to try to understand that the blurring of the lines might represent a threat to HA.

ICRC dialogue is driven by its mandates of protection, assistance and the conduct of hostilities. Beside this traditional dialogue we had to centre our discourse on inter-related concepts such as: access to victims, acceptable operational security, the concept of neutrality as an operational tool and, acceptance and perception, which are now at the centre of ICRC dialogue with armed forces.

The military are largely convinced they are fighting for a just cause, whether it is against terrorism, or for the stabilisation and reconstruction of a country or region, and are not very naturally willing to accept ICRC’s neutral position. Neutrality is often misperceived. An example is that it is naïve to believe that any HA is neutral; it is primarily political because in the end it has a political impact.

It is also naïve to believe that any of the actors will accept neutrality. Neutrality is often considered as passivity, or even a shameful surrender of principles. In our dialogue with armed forces we have to explain to them the difference between neutrality and confidentiality. ICRC neutrality has a very specific purpose, in order to obtain and maintain the trust of all parties and to be able to operate in acceptable security conditions in favour of all victims.

One of the last misconceptions is neutrality vs. just war; again, those who believe they have good reason to wage a war tend to misunderstand the motives of those who, owing to their neutrality, do not support them. In our view the notion of just war makes neutrality the best means through which contact with all parties can be achieved, and through which to conduct our HA.

Traditionally the ICRC has maintained a dialogue with all parties to a conflict, among them the military, but given the changing conflict dynamics of the last 15 years, ICRC has strengthened its unit for relations with armed and security forces. The original purpose of this unit was training in IHL in order to facilitate its integration into the military doctrine. Today it also aims to reinforce ICRC’s wider institutional dialogue with armed forces on specific issues such as ICRC principles. ICRC has a very transversal approach, in order to reach a more comprehensive and coherent definition of key
issues of relevance to dialogue with the armed forces. Before, armed forces were considered as a key interlocutor in the ICRC’s work as they are always working in conflict situations, but sometimes the relationship was very isolated. There was not an overall comprehensive approach to Armed Forces, and this unit is now trying to gather all the messages that should be passed in a comprehensive way. Regular contact at the appropriate level of the chain of command allows for a lively and open dialogue both ways. These dialogues permit the ICRC to assess the impact of its interventions and to shape its action accordingly.

TRAINING

The ICRC also participates in military exercises and training, in order to allow for a better and practical definition of its specific identity and operational modes of action in a safe environment. In such an environment, key issues can be discussed without suffering from the various constraints that characterise a real operational environment. For example, ICRC Deputy Head of Delegation to Kabul participated in the last NATO pre-deployment training for Afghanistan. With that tactic we also gain contact with commander of the force, and this helps to establish the operational contact.

CONCLUSION

To conclude, it is nevertheless necessary to stress that in certain contexts such as Afghanistan and Iraq the contact and dialogue necessary to reach acceptance is very problematic, particularly in relation to Non State Actors. In Afghanistan we are limited in our contacts mainly for security reasons and if having contact with the military is less difficult, contact with non-state actors is quite a problem, necessitating efforts to try to define alternative means of contact. Failing direct contact, trying to exert some influence, ICRC has organised conferences on International Humanitarian Law in Arabic targeting religious leaders and scholars. These types of experiences, at a more academic level with high profile religious leaders, are repeated in the field and seek to have some sort of influence on all the warring parties.

NGO NETWORK ADVOCACY AT UN LEVEL

"Ed Schenkenberg, Coordinator (ICVA)"

This section will outline what ICVA has done concerning the UN and Integrated Missions, what is ICVA’s message in this context, and where and with whom ICVA is intending to continue to engage on these issues.

ACTIVITIES ON GUIDELINES ON THE USE OF CIVIL AND MILITARY DEFENCE ASSETS (MCDA GUIDELINES)

ICVA was involved in intense negotiations during the development of the MCDA guidelines; ensuring the reflection of the humanitarian principles, the issue of last resort, and civilian control. In an emergency, state interests and political aspects often dominate, and the element of last resort can be overlooked by governments. ICVA was primarily seeking alliances with UN agencies that had a similar position, which was quite difficult to find at the time. It was difficult to develop these lines with UNHCR and easier with UNICEF, whereas OCHA’s position was less obvious. There were also national political positions to take into consideration, as the MCDA guidelines are essentially an intergovernmental document.

INTEGRATED MISSIONS

Integrated Missions (IM) were introduced to the UN system in 2005 under the Executive Committee for HA, a UN mechanism sitting in the UN Secretariat, composed of UN agencies, together with Department of Political Affairs and Department of Peace Keeping Operations.

NORWEGIAN STUDY ON IM

Since 2005 a study on Integrated Missions, led by a Norwegian team, has been in progress. The main message to emerge from this study appears to be that Integrated Missions will be the norm for the UN
in the future. However, there are issues around integrating HA with Development, into a structure led by a Special Representative of the Secretary General. On the other hand, it could be seen as a gain for HA that in certain situations, especially combat situations, there should be asymmetrical integration whereby different aspects of the operation are staggered, or some are omitted. Also of importance to the Humanitarian community is that “Hearts and Minds” campaigns undertaken by UN peacekeepers will be vetted or screened by the Humanitarian Coordinator.

REGIONAL CONFERENCES ON IM

In 2006 the Norwegian government initiated a series of conferences on Integrated Missions at regional level. There were conferences in; Johannesburg, New York, Brussels, Beijing, Addis Ababa, Geneva and Oslo. While the Norwegian government is supportive of IM, they also recognise that there are challenges and dilemmas for humanitarian stakeholders.

It is important to try to find an agenda of coherence, i.e. in setting the objectives and priorities of an Integrated Mission, and then ensuring that these are suitable across the range of actors. It is vital that humanitarian needs are not subordinate in the UN hierarchy of goals. This can be problematic in the UN system however given its size and multiple competing interests. In the UN system, there is a hierarchy of goals. Peace and Security come first, followed by Development, then probably Human Rights and Humanitarian Assistance; these two are competing for the last place. It is still essential to assert the primacy of humanitarianism and NGO perspectives in the formulation of these missions. ICVA were invited to at least four of the above mentioned conferences, and found it difficult to represent NGO thinking on the issue of Integrated Missions.

Listed below are the main advocacy messages ICVA brought to the conferences:

• Aid is not part of a political toolbox. HA should not come fourth or even lower in UN and Integrated Mission planning. It should take priority, or in fact be treated separately. When planning such missions, government objectives often dominate, and HA issues are not seen as a priority, but often treated as subordinate, as a means to achieving peace and security.

• If there is a guarantee in UN thinking that HA will not be integrated or will be integrated at a later stage, then we must in fact be sure what is humanitarian-and this is a particular problem—are NGOs themselves responsible for drawing the lines? As an NGO community we have a lot of work to do on how we understand humanitarian principles, and clarifying NGO positions on this is essential.

• If HA is to be demarcated from other forms of action, it is particularly important that this happens at the top; with the Humanitarian Coordinator. A particular problem there is the link of the humanitarian with the resident coordinator. The relationship with the government, rather than the population, is the UN’s first priority. This is problematic as the Resident Coordinator and/or the Humanitarian Coordinator is closely allied to the government, while at the same time has to advocate on behalf of IDPs. ICVA has been trying to address this issue for 3 or 4 years now.

• How do NGOs relate to Integrated Missions particularly on issues that are of common interest, for example the protection of civilians; it’s both an opportunity and a risk. It is an opportunity in terms of securing an area, instead of considering the use of armed escorts. NGOs must find a common position if unable to disassociate ourselves from protection tasks which are very specific to the military.

WHERE TO CONCENTRATE FUTURE EFFORTS

1) We must continue to engage with the UN system on issues relating to Integrated Missions and humanitarian aspects therein. OCHA can play a key role in this engagement, but it is very unclear as to OCHA’s position on this and indeed who could be a target person in OCHA. There was an idea in 2005 to set up a group of NGOs that could engage with OCHA or with the Policy Department on these issues, and particularly on mission planning.

2) We also need to engage with the UN on the ‘One UN’ developments. There is a real concern on the part of some agencies, especially among the UNHCR on shrinking humanitarian space within the UN; especially regarding the mixing of development and humanitarian agendas, in this context there are allies in the UN system open to NGO perspectives.
CONCLUSION

It is very easy to point fingers at the UN and at their weaknesses, however the NGO community also need to have a period of self reflection-where do we stand, and are we putting the right people in place? It is also important to question our positions on the humanitarian principles, and the commonalities of the humanitarian community, rather than focusing on technical aspects.

NGO ADVOCACY AND NATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR CIVMIL COORDINATION

Nils Carstensen, Senior Advisor (DanChurchAid)

Much of the more recent Danish debate on CivMil/CMCoord (and the particular Danish term Comprehensive Approach - CPA) was sparked by the latest Danish 5 year Defence Agreement passed by parliament on June 10, 2004. The agreement included the following paragraphs:

“It is generally agreed that the coordination of the military and civilian effort in international operations must be strengthened to synergise the individual efforts and increase the visibility of the overall Danish effort.”

Subsequently the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and three NGOs (plus an NGO backing group) met in October and November 2004 and by early 2005 a report from this interim working group was presented to the politicians behind the Danish Defence Agreement.

KEY POINTS IN THE 2004/05 REPORT FROM AN NGO PERSPECTIVE

• The report expressed a general agreement to link the Danish framework to the existing UN framework including the MCDA guidelines and recommendations from the Inter Agency Standing Committee 2004 Reference Paper.

• Emphasise that the allocation of humanitarian assistance is based on humanitarian principles, including neutrality and impartiality.

• Emphasise that it is entirely up to the NGOs whether they want to take part in civil-military cooperation, and that this can be determined in each individual situation by the NGOs themselves.

• Increased cooperation when it comes to training/education at national level, UN OCHA etc.

• The degree of coordination to be determined by the specific contexts:

  CivMil Coordination
  Co-existence  <-------------------------------------->  cooperation
  Actual armed conflict  <--------------------------->  (un)armed peace monitoring

CONCLUSION

Despite early scepticism on the part of much of the NGO sector, the process and the resulting report was positive. We achieved at least two important things:

• Established a common understanding of key international (UN) principles and guidelines underpinning CMCoord & CPA for Danish actors including important actors across MFA, MoD, NGOs and some important political players.

• The process helped create a network of individuals and institutions relevant to both policy and practise of CivMil Coordination/CPA.
SOME CHALLENGES AHEAD FOR NGOS

• At national and intergovernmental levels a lot of attention goes into planning/implementing terms such as “whole of governance, whole of nation - whole of alliance Approach”, Integrated Missions (UN), Comprehensive Approach etc.....as NGOs we risk getting caught “empty handed” as this almost as per definition rolls over our heads.

• Major challenge/concern from Iraq & Afghanistan: In areas where the presence of combat troops from our own nations essentially rules out humanitarian presence (by eroding our perceived independence etc.) state actors will increasingly fill the void with private operators, Quick Impact Projects (QIPs), CIMIC, hearts and minds operations, and civil protection/defence elements.

• Danish advocacy has been relatively successful so far due to constructive relationships between key NGO actors and between these actors and influential senior officers, civil servants and minister, but efforts towards other key politician have probably been all too few.

• At the international level a more deliberate, systematic and strategic alliance must be sought between NGO alliances/coalitions, OCHA (key UN humanitarian actors) and the ICRC. In isolation national NGOs will be lost.

• Key humanitarian principles, practices and documents can only be upheld and/or revised if we (NGOs, ICRC & some UN entities) coordinate our advocacy/lobby work.

• Understanding of key humanitarian principles regarding CivMil by field staff and some HQ staff is at best very varied. Brief, easy to read and remember guidelines are needed - could this be tackled jointly by NGO networks, academics, ECHO and other donors?

• The key challenge for NGOs/Humanitarians remains: How to stay engaged without compromising essential principles (“humanitarian space” in a wider sense)?

• There is a lack of independent evaluations of the impact, effectiveness - and effects on existing independent humanitarian efforts - of existing military QIPs, Cimic, reconstruction efforts in difficult environments, e.g. Iraq and Afghanistan. Could this be tackled jointly by NGO networks, academics, ECHO?

SUMMARY OF QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS FOLLOWING THE THIRD SESSION ON “NGO ADVOCACY STRATEGIES”

The main issues to emerge from this session were: organisations’ engagement with politicians and the issue of NGOs compromising themselves in such engagement.

NGOs and political engagement

• It seems futile to address the military, without simultaneously consulting those who decide their mandates: politicians. For example, the ICRC dialogue within the NATO structure addresses military as well as political level actors.

• There is a limit as to how far discussion and engagement with the military can succeed. It is sometimes necessary to cooperate on the political level in order to continue a meaningful exchange and remain informed of one another’s activities and stances.

Concerns over possible compromise of NGOs in their engagement with the military

• Having a common background and basic understanding has helped to mitigate criticism of NGOs for not being side by side with the military in combat zones. This does not equal acceptance of the consolidated approach, nor does it mean compliance with the military agenda in the field. However, the presence of NGOs for reasons of diversity and objectivity is very important, and this is where the humanitarian principles can be put into use. The NGO community needs to remain vigilant of organisations’ accepting non humanitarian agenda for reasons of funding.
The final working group of the seminar attempted to identify desired changes, as well as specific targets and critical steps in achieving these changes.

**Guidelines for Working Groups:**
1. For your allocated theme/issue, what change do we wish to bring about? What do we want to achieve?
2. Who are the key targets (e.g. NGOs/networks, EU, UN, NATO, other actors)?
3. What are two or three critical steps that are necessary to bring about the desired change with these targets? (e.g. through advocacy research, learning, capacity building etc.).

**Results of Session on Ways Forward**

**Translating principles into practice:**

- **Proposals on strengthening NGO coherence and operational practice**
  - Need to go ‘back to basics’ regarding the Red Cross Code of Conduct: ICRC, OCHA, or networks such as ICVA could facilitate inter-agency reviews of adherence to the Code of Conduct. Assessing our respect of core principles would be a necessary prerequisite and a platform for then addressing the specific issues at stake in implementing principles and guidelines focused on CivMil.
  - Identifying practical ways to translate principles into practice: Participants repeatedly emphasised the need for practical and ‘field-friendly’ means to promote existing principles and guidelines on CivMil. Towards this end, a number of participants expressed interest in exploring the potential to develop common NGO tools, guidelines or policy positions – which could promote NGO implementation of existing principles and guidelines at international level (e.g. Oslo, MCDA); and address any NGO-specific concerns or gaps not addressed by the existing documents. Diversity of the NGO sector was repeatedly raised as an inevitable challenge in any such efforts. Proposals included:
    - Sharing of individual NGOs’ draft internal guidelines on engagement with UN Integrated Missions (to share learning and avoid duplication of effort);
    - Build on analysis in the seminar discussion paper (by Mr. Raj Rana) which identifies areas of overlap and consensus in existing UN and NGO guidelines (e.g. MCDA, Oslo, SCHR) to develop a brief and practical summary document for dissemination to NGO field offices. Such an initiative could also provide the basis for developing a common NGO position to be used in advocacy.
    - Need to identify gaps in existing NGO and UN policies and guidelines (see further below on the gap in NGO guidelines regarding funding channelled through military operations).
    - Particular attention needs to be given to the challenges for field staff in ‘operationalising’ abstract and international-level principles and guidelines. In view of this, any such guidelines or other initiatives need to be developed with field input and ‘light’ in format/length/vocabulary in order to ensure they are ‘user-friendly’.
    - Any NGO initiatives in developing policies/positions/guidelines/tools on CivMil need to be complementary and in support of strengthening existing international policies and guidelines (e.g. Red Cross Code of Conduct; IASC paper; Oslo guidelines; MCDA guidelines).
  - NGO positions on donor funding through military and integrated civil-military operations: Discussions throughout the seminar addressed the trend amongst some donors towards channelling funding through military and integrated civil-military operations and financing instruments (e.g. AFRICOM, UN Integrated Missions, Provincial Reconstruction Teams). Participants stressed the need for greater clarity and consistency in NGO positioning on this issue. There is also a need for greater dialogue with donors to promote an ‘unbundling’ of funding; basing NGO advocacy on the impacts on NGO operations and beneficiary communities at field level.
Engagement with the UN on CivMil

- Effective civil-military relations require effective humanitarian coordination as a prerequisite. In this regard, seminar participants underlined the important role of the UN humanitarian system, and UN OCHA in particular. However, concerns were also raised about the inconsistent and sometimes weak nature of the UN, OCHA and specifically UN Humanitarian Coordinators in some contexts.

- Following on from the above, two key issues arose in terms of UN-NGO relations related to CivMil: [a] specific UN civil-military relations policies, institutions and strategies – in particular the need to strengthen and safeguard the role of OCHA, the CMCS, and Humanitarian Coordinators; and [b] wider UN humanitarian reform, and - in particular - the relative neglect of CivMil issues and relevant core principles of independence and neutrality in the UN reform process to-date.

- Participants identified a number of different entry-points and targets for engagement in CivMil issues within the UN system, including: OCHA - in particular the CMCS; the OCHA CMCS Information Sharing Group; the OCHA Donor Contact Group; the IASC standing committee on CivMil issues; DPKO; DPA; specific UN humanitarian agency active on CivMil issues (in particular UNICEF and UNHCR); and the relevant NGO consortia (i.e. ICVA, SCHR and InterAction).

- Specific proposals for follow-up in the short-term included:
  - ICVA, SCHR and VOICE to meet in mid-December and discuss next steps based on issues raised at the seminar.
    - Proposal that the UN-focused NGO networks, such as ICVA, SCHR and INTERACTION, convene a meeting of NGO experts focused on UN CivMil issues to explore issues raised at this seminar in more detail. Specific agenda items could include: sharing of NGO positions and guidelines on UN Integrated Missions; and proposals on inter-agency approaches to engaging with UN humanitarian agencies on their involvement in UN Integrated Missions (e.g. proposal that CivMil features on the agenda for the UNICEF NGO partner consultations in January 2008).
    - NGO consortia should explore the scope for introducing CivMil agenda in a strategic fashion into policy dialogue with UN agencies, based on a medium- to longer-term strategy rather than in a reactive fashion responding to ad-hoc UN policy initiatives. Such an approach could also be discussed at the meeting proposed above.
    - Address concerns about CivMil and humanitarian space in the UN humanitarian reform agenda by raising these issues in the context of initiatives focused on humanitarian coordination, clusters and the Global Humanitarian Platform initiative.

- Proposals for follow-up at UN level in the medium- to longer-term included:
  - Develop greater focus on CivMil, and wider humanitarian space issues, in the training of UN Humanitarian Coordinators.
  - Need to explore options for joint NGO strategies on CivMil in contexts in which UN humanitarian coordination is weak, absent or inappropriate.
  - Conduct a stock-taking of UN Integrated Missions and review experience since the UN-commissioned evaluation in 2005.
  - Develop NGO positioning on the ‘One UN’ agenda.
  - Explore options for facilitating appropriate NGO engagement in UN Integrated Mission planning (e.g. re-initiating engagement with OCHA’s Policy Branch on this issue).
  - Explore the scope for fundraising through the UN system to address structural gaps in NGO capacity to engage on CivMil issues at field and international levels.

EU Policy Developments

- Proposal to convene a VOICE working-group on civil-military relations under VOICE to address relevant issues raised in this seminar, as well as function as mechanism to follow-up engagement with other relevant NGO consortia and partners (e.g. ICVA and InterAction). This working-group’s precise focus needs to be further discussed. However, potential functions discussed included policy/advocacy, capacity-building and sharing of operational learning/‘best practice’. 
Participants placed a particular emphasis on the need to promote engagement at the national-level in European countries, as CivMil policy is developed at both international/European level and at national-level in EU Member States as well as UN and NATO.

Policy issues that were raised as of particular concern included: implementation of the EU Humanitarian Consensus and the Council Conclusions on Security and Development. Of particular concern are the commitments towards protecting humanitarian space, consulting NGOs on pre-deployment planning for EU missions; and the commitments on establishing appropriate CivMil coordination/dialogue mechanisms and deploying CivMil liaison officers at field level.

Monitor how civil protection aspects in the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid will be implemented (e.g. in the Action Plan which will be developed) and consider whether DG Environment should be targeted when trying to influence policies on the use of civil protection assets in natural disasters in third countries.

Proposal that the planned EU operation in Chad provide a particular focus for activity; including the gathering of lessons learned to inform future policy and operations. Further research is also required to develop the evidence base of NGO experience of EU missions in DRC and Lebanon.

Priority targets for policy engagement include the EU Council; DG RELEX, DG ECHO and DG Environment in the Commission. However, particular attention is also required at national level in EU Member States targeting relevant line ministries.

Security... Perceptions.... Armed Escorts

Role of armed escorts and private security/military companies (PMCs): Their role has been generally neglected by the NGO sector. However, PMCs are increasingly seeking to expand their role in both security management and direct implementation of aid programmes. UN OCHA has commissioned a study of the role of PMCs, which a number of agencies participating in this seminar are contributing to. Specific issues raised for follow-up included:

- Need for NGO HQ staff to be better informed of engagement with PMCs by NGO field offices. Discussions suggested that many staff are unaware of the realities at field level in this regard, which undermines effective policy engagement or technical support to field offices.

- Need for NGOs to explore learning on good practice in the hiring of PMCs and other forms of armed escorts. Need for such efforts to connect with wider conflict sensitivity, safety and security management and general programme quality/strategy issues.

- Need for NGOs to engage in policy/advocacy with donors to alert them to the problematic impacts at field level of engaging PMCs in aid delivery.

- Proposal that the VOICE Secretariat compiles and circulates a list of background briefing materials on PMCs to add to the reading list provided in this seminar’s discussion paper and folder for participants.

Use of armed escorts: The use of armed escorts by NGOs was also repeatedly raised as a contentious issue in NGO CivMil practice. Contexts such as Uganda and Chad were mentioned as countries where the use of armed escorts was questioned as necessary by some participants. In order to assess the connection between policy and practice, participants felt that there was a need to review practice at field level. This could serve to both ‘reality-check’ existing international policies and guidelines; and to promote greater coherence between HQs and field offices on CivMil policy and practice.

Perceptions of NGOs and CivMil issues among local populations: A number of participants highlighted the central importance of local perceptions of NGOs and NGO approaches to CivMil. Building on research by Tufts University and the BAAG/ENNA networks on CivMil in contexts like Afghanistan, participants repeatedly underlined the importance of NGOs developing more proactive strategies to [a] understand local perceptions and [b] communicate our principles-based approach to CivMil strategies to local communities and other relevant stakeholders. In this regard, particular emphasis was placed on the need to strengthen this aspect in relation to NGO recruitment strategies, pre-deployment training and context analysis in programme design, monitoring and evaluation.
ANNEXES
NGO SEMINAR ON CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
3 - 4 DECEMBER 2007
Maison des Association Internationales, Rue Washington 40, Brussels

MONDAY, 3 DECEMBER

09:00-10:00 Registration and Coffee
10:00-10:20 Introductory Session - Kathrin Schick, VOICE Director and Lola Gostelow, Consultant
Facilitator: Lola Gostelow

TRENDS IN CIVMIL POLICY AND PRACTICE
10:20-11:45 Presentations
- UN CIVMIL Policy Trends
  Ingrid Nordstrom-Ho, Deputy Chief, CivMil Coordination Section, OCHA
- US CIVMIL Policy Trends
  Linda Poteat, Director Disaster Responses, Interaction
- EU CIVMIL Policy Trends
  Joachime Nason, Coordinator Inter-Institutional relations on crisis management, DG ECHO
- NATO Policy Trends
  Howard Mollett, Humanitarian Policy Advisor, CARE UK

Questions and answers
11:45-12:00 Coffee Break
12:00-13:00 Break out groups
13:00-13:15 Report back
13:15-14:30 Lunch

PRESENTATION OF DISCUSSION PAPER
14:30-15.00 Raj Rana, Consultant

NGO CIVMIL OPERATIONAL STRATEGIES
15:00-16:00 NGO Presentations
- Relevance of UN/ NGO Guidelines, Standards and Principles in CIVMIL
  Lisbeth Pilegaard, Head - Technical Support Section, Int. Department, Norwegian Refugee Council
- NGO engagement with international forces on protection, security and armed escorts
  Loris De Filippi, Operational Coordinator, MSF Italy
- NGO CIVMIL advocacy in Afghanistan
  Anja de Beer, Director ACBAR, Afghanistan

Questions and answers
16:00-16:15 Coffee Break
16:15-17:15 Break-out groups
17:15-17:45 Feedback
TUESDAY, 4 DECEMBER

NGO ADVOCACY STRATEGIES

09:00-09:30  Summary from the previous day

09:30-10:30  Advocacy Strategies at international/national level

• Neutral and Independent Humanitarian Action - NIHA
  Martin Lacourt, Security and Armed Forces Delegate, ICRC

• NGO Network advocacy at UN level
  Ed Schenkenberg, Coordinator, ICVA

• NGO advocacy and national framework for CivMil coordination
  Nils Carstensen, Senior Advisor, DanChurchAid

Questions and answers

10:30-10:45  Coffee Break

WAYS FORWARD

10.45-12.00  Break-out groups on potential advocacy issues and strategies

12:00-12:30  Report back

12.30-13.30  Conclusions on follow-up activities

13.30  Closing and sandwich lunch
# LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

## SPEAKERS

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FACILITATOR

Lola Gostelow is an independent humanitarian consultant with 17 years experience in the aid sector. Lola’s background is in nutrition and food security programming, but her work has focused on emergency programming and humanitarian policy. As Humanitarian Policy Advisor to Save the Children UK, Lola developed a strong research and advocacy agenda on the humanitarian-military interface. She was involved in policy-level discussions with DFID, MoD and NATO, on the need for increased accountability for actions by military personnel that impinge on the work of aid agencies. As a consultant, Lola continues to be involved in debates on the civil-military nexus, including through her membership of the UK’s NGO-Military Contact Group.

CONSULTANT

Raj Rana is currently an independent consultant, with eight year’s experience, linked to the Geneva Centre for Security Policy. His experience includes six years in the field in Afghanistan, Eastern DRC, North Caucasus/ Chechnya, Darfur and Iraq, and with the Canadian Armed Forces as a peacekeeper in Bosnia in 1993-1994. He has also worked at ICRC headquarters in Geneva as a military advisor, contributed to the Sphere project on military issues, and has spoken on numerous occasions to the existing range of CIMIC/CMC training courses.

SPEAKERS

Ingrid Nordström-Ho is the Deputy Chief of the Civil-Military Coordination Section (CMCS) of OCHA’s Emergency Services Branch in Geneva. She is the focal point for the development of guidelines on Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCcoord) and has facilitated international processes leading to the adoption of the “MCDA Guidelines” for the use of military and civil defence assets (MCDA) in complex emergencies; the UN Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination Concept; and most recently the update of the 1994 “Oslo Guidelines” covering the use of MCDA in natural disasters.

Linda Poteat is the Director for Disaster Response in the Humanitarian Policy and Practice unit at InterAction. She has recently returned from ten years in the field including postings in Russia, the Balkans, eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sierra Leone. At InterAction, Linda facilitates the complex emergency working groups, such as Sudan, DRC, and Afghanistan, and also manages the civil-military portfolio. She is an adjunct professor at George Washington University in the Elliott School of International Affairs, as well as guest lecturing in the US and the UK. She has been working closely with USAID on issues pertinent to the development of Africa Command.

Joachime Nason has law qualifications from Vrije Universiteit Brussel and from George Washington University. She has been with the European Commission, Department for Humanitarian Aid/ DG ECHO since 2001. During her time in the Commission she has had responsibility for the Middle East desk, inter-institutional relations on CFSP and ESDP matters. She is currently on the desk for the coordination of Civil Military relations in DG ECHO.

Lisbeth Pilegaard is the Head of Section in the International Programme Department of the Norwegian Refugee Council HQ, Norway. Ms. Pilegaard has more than ten years’ working experience in emergency and refugee work for NGOs and the Red Cross including most recently three years as Regional Representative for NRC in Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan.

Loris De Filippi, registered nurse, is currently the Operational Coordinator for South-Central America and Ethiopia for Médecins sans Frontières Belgium, based in Roma. His experience includes 10 years of field and HQ experience with MSF Belgium in Kenya, Albania, Eastern DRC, Sudan, Indonesia and Haiti. He has also worked in Italy as Head of mission on migrants projects. Since 2003 he has been part of the faculty of ISPI (Istituto Studi di Politica Internazionale) coordinating training courses on response to emergencies and complex humanitarian crisis.
Anja de Beer has been working in development since 1994 in Tajikistan, Haiti and Afghanistan. She has been working in Afghanistan since June 2000, first with the ICRC and then with International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) in support of the institutional development of the Afghan Red Crescent.

In August 2003 Ms. de Beer became Executive Coordinator of Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR), an umbrella organization for 90 national and international NGOs. ACBAR offers a platform for NGOs to voice their concerns on topics like NGO legislation, Code of Conduct, security and PRTs. ACBAR also coordinates efforts of the NGO community to influence the development policies of the Afghan Government and donors.

Martin Lacourt, born in Geneva on 13 Aug 1964, graduated from the University of Geneva in History and Political Science. Before entering the ICRC, Mr. Lacourt worked for 10 years for financial companies as marketing manager, branch director and regional director.

He has been working with the ICRC since 2001 as a Field Delegate Kandahar - Afghanistan during the Taliban era, and in Medellin - Colombia. In 2003 he became head of Sub-delegation Guinea-Conakry (covering borders with Sierra Leone and Liberia), and worked as Continental Armed Forces Delegate (covering all South America) between 2004 and 2006. He is currently the Senior Armed Forces Delegate for Western Europe.

Ed Schenkenberg van Mierop has been Coordinator of the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) since 1998. He has expertise in humanitarian coordination, the relationship between humanitarian agencies and the military, the protection of refugees and other forcibly displaced people, and the interface between human rights and humanitarian aid. His recent field trips have focused on the relationship between the UN and NGOs. Ed currently holds the Chair of the Board of the Sphere Project. From 1992 until 1998, he worked as a humanitarian affairs officer with Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) in Amsterdam, the Netherlands.

Nils Carstensen. With a back ground in journalism and research, Nils Carstensen has worked with humanitarian crises and issues for more than 15 years. For most of this time, he has worked with DanChurch Aid and ACT International as information officer, researcher and currently as senior advisor on emergencies and advocacy. Mr. Carstensen has, among other things, been involved with drafting the joint Danish Comprehensive Approach Paper setting a national framework for Civil and Military Coordination (CMCoord) and continues to be engaged in ongoing Danish and international civil-military dialogue.

Howard Mollett is the Humanitarian Aid Policy Advisor at CARE International UK. His work focuses on conflict and post-conflict transition environments. His areas of expertise are humanitarian action in conflict and post-conflict transition environments. His background is in research and advocacy on civil society issues and the connection between security and development policy.
BACKGROUND DOCUMENTS

GUIDELINES ON CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS

MCDA GUIDELINES 2003
Guidelines on The Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets To Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies

OSLO GUIDELINES 2006
The use of military and civil defense assets in disaster relief

AFGHANISTAN GUIDELINES 2007
Guidelines for the interaction and coordination of Humanitarian actors and military actors in Afghanistan (Working Paper)

INTERACTION 2007
Guidelines for relations between US Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organisations

POSITION PAPERS, REPORTS AND ARTICLES

VOICE, 2003
Statement from Humanitarian NGOs, Members of VOICE on Civil Military Cooperation in the field

SCHR, 2004
Position Paper on Humanitarian Military Relations in the Provision of Humanitarian Assistance

BAAG/ ENNA, 2007
Position on civil-military relations

BARBARA J STAPLETON, 2007
A Means to What End? Why PRTs are Peripheral to the Bigger Political Challenges in Afghanistan

UNIVERSITY OF UTRECHT. COMMISSIONED FOR CORDAID, 2006
Principles and Pragmatism. Civil Military action in Afghanistan and Liberia

HPG, 2006
Research Briefing 21: Resetting the rules of engagement

HPG, 2006
Research Briefing 22: The Military and civilian protection: developing roles and capacities

VENRO, 2003
Position Paper. Armed forces as humanitarian aid workers?
VOICE stands for Voluntary Organisations in Cooperation in Emergencies. It is a network representing some 90 European non-governmental organisations (NGOs) active in humanitarian aid worldwide. Seeking to involve its members in information, training, advocacy and lobbying, VOICE is the main NGO interlocutor with the European Union on emergency aid, relief, rehabilitation and disaster preparedness. As a European network, it represents and promotes the values and specificities of humanitarian NGOs, in collaboration with other humanitarian actors. Based in Brussels, VOICE has been active since 1993 and is an independent organisation under Belgian law since 2001.