



**AFGHANISTAN:  
THE ROAD TO RECOVERY  
AND THE ROLE OF NGOS**

**REPORT OF THE SEMINAR  
ORGANISED BY EURONAIID AND VOICE**  
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**PREPARED FOR:  
EURONAIID AND VOICE  
BY: NASSIM JAWAD**

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## 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On 14 February 2002 a seminar on Afghanistan was organised jointly by VOICE and EuronAid. The two NGO networks, respectively working in the sectors of Humanitarian Aid and Food Aid/Food Security represent more than 100 European NGOs working in the humanitarian and development sector. More than 50 NGOs working in Afghanistan participated in the seminar.

The rapidly changing events and developments in Afghanistan since the events of 11 September in the United States had become a growing concern for NGOs, network organisations and donor agencies alike. Already before the US-led military actions, some six million people were estimated to be in dire need of basic humanitarian assistance, especially food. Tens of thousands of people were displaced as the military actions took pace and the “Northern Alliance” advanced through major parts of the country as part of an aggressive and intensive military campaign.

Many Voice and EuronAid member-NGOs were already working in Afghanistan for many years, most with EC funding, in addition to other sources. Discussions between VOICE and EuronAid started in December 2001, on the need to organise a seminar where common concerns between the NGOs themselves and between NGOs and the EC could be discussed. These included short-term and medium-term policies and strategies for the humanitarian, as well as rehabilitation aid.

However, towards mid December 2001 political initiatives were taking place along military developments, which eventually led to the creation of an Interim Government in Bonn, under the auspices of the United Nations, hosted by the European Union. Parallel meetings took place in Berlin, Brussels and Islamabad to discuss the recovery and rehabilitation of Afghanistan, which eventually led to the Tokyo Conference organised jointly by the Trust Fund for Afghanistan and the donor states.

As an active member of the donor countries, in December 2001, the European Commission developed a draft strategy towards immediate and longer-term needs of Afghanistan and committed a substantial multi-annual contribution, conditioned on peace and stability in Afghanistan. This strategy was further developed and up-dated after the Tokyo Conference on 21/22 January 2002.

At the same time, many NGOs including VOICE and EuronAid members voiced the urgent need for a platform where Afghanistan’s needs in short-term and medium-term could be discussed, and views and opinions could be exchanged, especially with donor agencies and their policies and strategies. It is on this background that the seminar was organised.

The immediate objective of this seminar was to discuss the EC strategy for Afghanistan and the role of NGOs in the implementation of the strategy. The seminar aimed to look at added values of the NGOs, their experiences and expertise in the implementation of the EC strategy. The ultimate objective of the seminar, however, was to strengthen the relationship between the EC and the NGOs on the basis of dialogue and mutual exchange of experience and information.

The present EC strategy is just set to address some of these main issues over the next years to come. It determines sectoral priorities, such as:

- **Institution Building** to address the chronic need for a viable and functional administration, beyond Kabul;
- **Rural Economic Recovery** with improvements in the agricultural and animal husbandry, as well as other rural infrastructure;
- A **Social Services** component to provide access to all in basic health and education;
- An **Urban Recovery** element to address the basic needs of urban population through short-term interventions.

Similarly, the strategy takes into account additional needs for cross cutting issues, such as gender, human rights, environment, as well as in areas of migration and drug control.

Over the last ten years, NGOs have been the main partners for EC programmes in Afghanistan. The EC recognises the importance of the role NGOs have played in the past and will play in the future plans in Afghanistan. As such, the **strategy** states clearly, that because of the nature of its implementation, it **will be mainly implemented through its NGO partners**.

The work and the methodology of NGOs gives an added values to their interventions which is different from many international institutions:

- **independence** and the extent of **flexibility** to adapt their activities in accordance to the needs of the communities;
- NGOs are **cost-effective** and non-bureaucratic;
- and far more, they are **out in the rural areas** and work closely with the local communities, the local NGOs and with local staff, while most larger international organisations might concentrate their efforts on the capital Kabul and other major cities.

Both NGOs and the EC confirm the need for further dialogue and their objective to consolidate this partnership, especially in the light of a complex situation in Afghanistan.

As the flow of funds continue to increase over the next months, the major task for the international community will be to coordinate the efforts appropriately. Coordination, however, must be treated equally at the policy levels and at the field levels. While both the EC and the NGOs agree on the need for coordination between the NGOs themselves, the NGOs and the donor community, and between NGOs and the Afghan Government, the EC believes that **overall coordination must be Kabul-based and Afghan-owned**. Therefore, overall coordination must be chaired by the Afghan Government, even if external assistance is required.

**Afghan ownership** and involvement is paramount in the processes of relief and rehabilitation. Afghan ownership must not remain just a lip service in strategies, but rather an objective of the international community, that will require strategies to materialize the objective. Afghan ownership, therefore, must be considered at three distinct levels: at the **Government** level, both at central and local; at the **civil society** level, e.g. the Afghan NGOs; and at the **community** level, through appropriate use of local social structures. Afghan involvement is, hence, not only a necessity in coordination, but also in planning and decision-making processes. Consequently, Afghan ownership should be treated as an objective of the strategies.

**Capacity building** and training components as integrated part of each programme, therefore, are vital to increase Afghan involvement through increased capacities and to empower communities to take over responsibilities for their own lives in longer-term. Only then can we speak of sustainability of relief and rehabilitation efforts and can guarantee lasting impact for external assistance.

Therefore, both the EC and the NGOs agree that a **joint approach** is needed with regard to **local administration** involvement and the **local NGOs**. Similarly, specific studies should be carried out towards the social and traditional community structures and how best these could be used as a mean of community ownership and empowerment in the rehabilitation and development processes.

While existing capacities and capabilities are being studied and up-graded, the return of the **Afghan Diaspora**, the major source of skilled and qualified Afghans, should be assisted and facilitated as part of the rehabilitation and reconstruction strategies.

The way in which the international community, including their Afghan partners, will address the humanitarian crisis in the next year will have significant impact on the long-term development perspectives on the country. With millions of people in dire need of basic supplies, such as food, shelter and basic social services, **emergency relief** will play an important role over the next one or two years. Similarly, **food aid and food security** will be at the heart of the problem over the next two years to enable communities to rebuild agriculture and animal husbandry, the basis of survival for 85% of the population, and the required infrastructure.

Whether relief or rehabilitation, food aid and food security or longer-term agricultural development, **security and access** to rural areas - presently a major obstacle - are key issues for NGOs to access the most needy communities in the country. The EC should, therefore, use its influence, through its member-states, to put pressure on the international community and the United Nations to extend the mandate of the international peacekeeping forces beyond Kabul. The extension should also include securing major access roads, that are vital for the transport of goods to those communities.

Last, but not least, participants agreed that events and developments in Afghanistan are very fluid and will impact our plans and strategies at a great deal. Therefore, it is important that developments are evaluated regularly and that plans, policies and strategies should be flexible enough to be adapted and be able to keep pace with the Afghans, provided security and stability prevail in the country and the fragile peace holds.

## 2. INTRODUCTION

The horrifying events of 11 September 2001 reminded the world community that Afghanistan's grief and agony must not be seen in isolation and that it should not be left alone. The inhumane incidents also taught us that unless terror and inhumanity is curbed at its roots, it could have severe affects on the world community at large.

Despite the bombing that continues to this date, with heavy tolls on the civilian side, the recent political developments give hope to Afghanistan and its future prospect. A **compromised political agreement** from Bonn, hosted by the European Union (EU), to Tokyo, hosted by the "Trust Fund for Afghanistan's Reconstruction" and co-hosted by the EU have all been part of a political process to which the EC strategy is a constituent. The strategy is an element of political commitment with substantial financial backing to the present and future Afghan Governments for a lasting peace, stability and development process. As the political process within Afghanistan moves slowly ahead, so must the rehabilitation processes **move slowly, but sustainably**.

However, Afghanistan has always been caught in actions and events that are deeply political, and Afghanistan's neighbours have always played an important role in these events and actions. Afghanistan's recovery cannot be seen in isolation from its regional context and, therefore, **regional issues must be addressed** too. While this seminar was not directly concerned with the regional issues, it was recommended that a similar gathering be organised by the NGO community to address the regional context of Afghanistan and to discuss ways and means how regional challenges could be addressed without threatening peace and stability inside Afghanistan.

The Chairman of the Afghan Interim Government, Mr. Hamid Karzai, when asked about priorities in recovery processes in Afghanistan, always states that: '**...there is no single priority in Afghanistan, the whole country is a priority!**' Recovery as a development objective, however, in the Afghan context, is not just restoring what used to be there. It should rather be seen as an attempt to gain and maintain a standard of living that will allow citizens to have access to basic social services, to a sustainable livelihood, to security and justice, and that will give them the right to social and political participation and equity. As aid agencies we must have respect for humanitarian principles and human rights, while showing more sensitivity on the issues of gender and ethnicity.

### 2.1. THE ORGANISORS: VOICE AND EURONAIID

**VOICE (Voluntary Organisations in Cooperation in Emergencies)** is a network of 100 Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) throughout Europe that are active in the field of humanitarian aid, including emergency aid, rehabilitation, disaster preparedness and conflict prevention. VOICE was created in 1992, and became an independent NGO in March 2001.

VOICE's essential overriding mission is to foster links among humanitarian aid NGOs. VOICE also aims to facilitate contacts with the European Union and to develop collaboration with international humanitarian organisations.

VOICE is acting as a mouthpiece for the values and specific features of humanitarian NGOs, and is giving the NGOs the opportunity for discussion and collaboration, together with services, which meet the needs of their humanitarian action. VOICE is also a linking unit for joint activities involving a number of NGOS or networks.

VOICE accomplishes these aims with four types of services: Developing information; Devising instruments for consultation; Giving political expression to the shared concerns of NGOs; and Developing the life of its network.

**EuronAid-The United Approach** is a specialized and operational European network for Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) founded in 1981, owned and guided by member-NGOs active in the field of Food Aid and Food Security (FA & FS). The main purposes of EuronAid are to facilitate the implementation of NGO programmes, to promote dialogue on Food Aid and Food Security policies with the European Commission (EC), as well as other interested parties and provide training and information on Food Aid and Food Security.

EuronAid has 32 permanent members and serves more than 130 NGOs worldwide.

EuronAid's core activities relate to the provision of operation services, such as purchasing and logistics to NGOs, mainly regarding aid in kind funded by the EC food security budget line, information and training, networking and lobbying.

The work of the Secretariat (26 staff, including four county offices in the field) is supported by the members through the Board, the General Assembly and the working groups.

### **3. AFGHANISTAN: BACKGROUND**

#### **3.1. GENERAL OVERVIEW**

Afghanistan is a landlocked country with a total area of 647,500 sq. km, with an arid and semi-arid climate, i.e. cold winters and hot summers, mostly rugged mountains, with plains in the North and Southeast. Arable land makes up only 12% of the total area, with 46% pasture and 3% woodland. In 1993, the total irrigated land was estimated at approximately 30,000 sq. km. During the last two decades of war and the devastating three years of drought, massive cut down of forests and woodland has caused serious soil degradation, overgrazing and deforestation. Continuous cutting down of forests and orchards has caused massive desertification of former woodland and orchards.

Since mid 1970s no census has been carried out in Afghanistan, however, in 2001 the United Nations offices estimated Afghanistan's population at around 26 million, including refugees living in Iran and Pakistan. In the same year, population growth was estimated at 3.48% and birth rate at 4.14%, with the death rate at around 1.77%. Infant mortality is presently rated at 14.7% and average life expectancy at 46.24 years.

Even before the war, 85% of the population depended on agriculture and animal husbandry (mainly goats and sheep raising). Afghanistan has always been a pre-industrial society, where mining and manufacturing were marginal activities, with coal, natural gas, textiles and cement production employing only small number of the workforce. During the 1970s trade employed a significant number of people, while the oil boom period of the 1970s attracted a large number of labour-force to the Gulf and Iran. The state remained the largest single employer with some 90,000 civil servants and 50,000 more in the education and health sector. The armed forces accounted for 80,000 in the army (mostly conscripts) and an additional 10,000 in the airforce.

Once almost self-sufficient in food production, Afghanistan has changed its place in the world economic development, to one of the poorest countries. The latest OXFAM International report rates Afghanistan as "the poorest country in Asia." Continuous civil war, accompanied by persisting drought of the last three years has plunged Afghanistan into an unimaginable scale of poverty and destitution never witnessed before. Malnutrition is on the rise and the recent United Nations reports confirm that an estimated six million people are in urgent need of food and other basic necessities in the country.

Women and children have been the biggest victims of the last 23 years of war and civil conflict, with an estimated 20,000 widows and 50,000 orphans in Kabul city alone, who largely depend on external support for survival.

Two consequent generations have been deprived of the right to education within the country, while refugee communities in Iran and Pakistan had limited access to formal education. Violation of basic human rights of women and children already practiced by warring factions during the 1980s and early 1990s have been further enforced by the Taliban since 1996.

The presence of a young generation in the country itself and in the refugee camps, which has been split geographically and ideologically, used to gun-culture and war for the last 23 years, presents a grim picture for the future of Afghanistan.

With the persecution of intellectuals and educated elite by the fundamentalist groups in Pakistan and Iran in the 1980s and the continuing war in the 1990s, almost the entire educated elite has left the country. Of these, the vast majority have sought refuge in Western Europe, United States, Canada and Australia, many of whom may not return unless security and safety prevails in the country.

Afghanistan's social and economic reconstruction and rehabilitation, therefore, present an incredible and probably the most difficult task for the international community. Similar to its political solution, there are no simple answers to Afghanistan's social and economic recovery which requires a multiple approach that



can handle the urgent needs of millions of people in dire need of food and basic services, as well as its longer-term development needs. While emergency and humanitarian aid is presently inevitable, these however must be closely linked to its longer-term rehabilitation and reconstruction processes.

The success of an effective and efficient humanitarian aid depend much on how aid is structured. One way to address the present humanitarian crisis with the aim of reducing dependency and avoiding future problems, is the approach of an active policy of structural poverty alleviation.

A structural poverty alleviation will have to address the urgent needs with a perspective of longer-term needs of the communities and requires the active involvement and participation of the communities in question. Such an approach can eventually lead towards a more sustainable and structured mid-term and longer-term development processes.

### **3.2. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND PRESENT SITUATION**

#### **From Elizabeth Winter's Key Note Address to the Seminar**

Recent events in Afghanistan give cause for concern that stability is seriously threatened. The Bonn peace process gave us hope, (despite the bombing that preceded it and which continues to this day to cause civilian casualties now estimated to be in the 1,000's), hope that the international community would not abandon Afghanistan this time. To reach agreement on a process to achieve peace and a stable government was a great achievement by Brahimi, Vendrell and others behind the scenes including Afghans. The inauguration of the government on December 22<sup>nd</sup> was seen as a turning point.

Aid workers, already exhausted from coping with the needs of people suffering from the longest drought in living memory, and keeping themselves and their families safe and the beneficiaries of their programmes provided for despite the bombing and imminent winter, were now expected to attend one meeting after another. These meetings were often a great distance apart as each country in the world seemed to want to get in on the act and sometimes the NGOs were excluded when they did arrive. They were expected to contribute to written material too and to provide evidence for the rapid needs assessment carried out prior to the Tokyo meeting co-hosted by the EU, Japan, the United States and Saudi Arabia. To decline to be involved, to wait until the juggernaut had passed by or perhaps rolled over them meant worrying about missing out on resources and on providing an Afghan viewpoint. There was the further pressure of being told that everything had to be decided quickly – to capitalise on money being available now and to show that there had been a peace dividend.

There was little time to reflect, so common positions were often drawn up in the night. They were remarkably consistent from the experienced NGOs, both Afghan and International:

- 1) Above all make sure that the reconstruction process is led by Afghans themselves. I would recommend that we do not just pay lip-service to this, it is not good enough to say that Afghans must be in the driving seat when some people have not even allowed them in the car and with the same breath are saying that there is no time to consult.
- 2) Build on what is already known and has been achieved, and develop civil society.
- 3) The process should be bottom up and community driven.
- 4) There should be time for Afghans to reflect and consider the best way forward.
- 5) The Diaspora, with its valuable skills, should be facilitated to return.
- 6) Funding should continue for long-term programmes and quick fixes should be avoided in favour of sustainability.
- 7) There must be respect for humanitarian principles and human rights but more sensitivity should be shown on the issues of gender and ethnicity; simplistic ideas had exacerbated difficulties in the past.

The Afghan Interim Government Chairman, Hamid Karzai, has travelled to the USA, UK and elsewhere, asking, as Lakhdar Brahimi the Special Representative also has, for more troops so that the major cities and

roads can be secure. Afghans concur with this request. Entrepreneurs say, with justification, that they can get the economy going if there is security. It is said to have grown by 25% in 1995 in the 6 months without hostilities. Afghans are now returning to Afghanistan in greater numbers than are leaving the country. One can only hope that behind the scenes discussions will produce an enlarged security force.

The 21 person Commission to set up the Loya Jirga that will decide the future transitional authority has been chosen and has met informally and formally. There are two or three women on it, one of whom is from an NGO as one of the male members, which is encouraging. The Bonn process remains within its timetable, Ministers are back from their travels to raise money and to begin the work of governing. They are recruiting Afghans from the Diaspora as well as locally and people are arriving to claim jobs they held previously.

It is easy to be overwhelmed when looking at the task that faces the Afghan people and the international community. A lot of planning is being done but who has the overall picture, and will the jockeying for territory and position undermine the attempts at coherence? Will the new people coming in with little experience to the UN and to NGOs be willing to listen to those who have the experience or will they be swamped?

It is encouraging that attempts are being made to have a joint UN/NGO Code of Conduct for employing staff, to ensure salaries are fair and sustainable, but will it be honoured? One Afghan NGO is reported to have lost 16 staff members in the last two weeks to jobs as drivers and interpreters. It is also encouraging that ACBAR, ICC and ANCB, the three co-ordinating bodies, now issue joint statements. But ACBAR is still looking for a Director to lead it through the current maelstrom.

It is important that NGOs relate well to the interim authorities and to the eventual government, to advise, strengthen and complement their efforts. Discussions are taking place with the current administration and would be good if NGOs could pre-empt any unsuitable forms of control by offering suggestions for registration and ways to ensure appropriate behaviour in the new situation. NGOs need to examine their objectives, policies and practices too in the light of the new circumstances in Afghanistan as well as world-wide.

What is the role of NGOs, of expatriates? How do NGOs relate to or become part of civil society? These and other issues should be considered seriously with the presence of a legitimate government and an Afghan civil society, even if small and not strong enough, taking into account lessons learned elsewhere. NGOs have the experience of Afghanistan and running services there throughout the war. It is therefore to be hoped that the staff, particularly the Afghans, can be represented on decision-making bodies such as the Secretariat of the Implementation Group. There is apparently a lot of money available but it is important that it is spent wisely.

## 4. THE AFGHAN CRISIS AND THE HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

The Bonn meeting of December 2001, to establish an “Afghan Interim Government” and to chart out the political future of Afghanistan, hosted by the European Union, paved the way to massive international commitment towards Afghanistan’s transition from crisis to reconstruction. Several meetings took place since December 2001, which ended up with the “Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund “ (ARTF) in Tokyo, where almost 3.8 billion US\$ was pledged by the international community.

The Tokyo Conference in January 2002 was a clear indication of the international commitment towards a longer-term process of stability, rehabilitation and reconstruction. The UNDP/World Bank Needs Assessment (Preliminary Needs Assessment) that was used as the basis of requirements for the next five years estimated the reconstruction costs at about 10 billion US\$. Of the total requirements, the EU Member States and the European Commission have so far pledged close to 2.3 billion Euros for the period 2002 to 2006. ‘This represents 23% of the UNDP-WB Needs Assessment for the coming five years and over 45% of the total announced pledges of the international community over the same period.’

‘The pledges announced by the EU Member States and the European Commission at the Tokyo Conference are tangible proof of EU’s political engagement. For the year 2002, the EU has pledged some 600 million Euros, with 400 million Euro corresponding to Member States contributions and 200 million to the European Commission. This represents over 30% of the estimated needs and of the total amount announced in Tokyo by the international community for the year 2002.’

(Source: The European Union’s contribution to the reconstruction process of Afghanistan; a legal notice, by the EU’s External Relations Unit, 22 January 2002)

The total programme budget required for the year 2002, as reflected by the UNDP/WB Needs Assessment, has been estimated at around 1.33 billion US\$.

‘The EU stressed during the (Tokyo) Conference, that these long-term contributions are conditional on the full implementation of the letter and the spirit of the Bonn/Petersberg Agreement, which is the best guarantee for the establishment of a representative Government, as well as a new social, political and economic reality, based on democratic values and the respect for human rights, gender equality and political and religious tolerance.’

(Source: The same document above!)

### 4.1. OVERVIEW OF EUROPEAN UNION CONTRIBUTIONS SINCE 1991

According to reports by the European Commission (EC), since 1991, the Commission has committed some 500 million Euros to Afghan population in need – implemented through UN agencies, the Red Cross movement and NGOs. It was the single largest donor until last year when USA increased substantially its food aid.

**During the year 2001:** the European Union (EU) has responded to the Afghan crisis with a total commitment of 365 million Euros, of which 116 million Euro has been contributed through the EC.

A total of 57.4 million Euro has been utilised for emergency humanitarian aid through ECHO, of which approximately 32 million Euro has been channeled through the NGOs. Food Security programme has committed a total of 28.8 million Euros, while the EC’s aid to uprooted people has made a contribution of 15 million Euros, during the year 2001.

**Overview of the EC commitments for the year 2002:** In accordance with the EC strategy for Afghanistan's transition from crisis to reconstruction, the EC has made a commitment of about 220 million Euros for the year 2002, in addition to its contribution towards the "Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund".

In an "Information Note" published by the EC on 16 January 2002, "Components of the Provisional EC Recovery and Reconstruction Programme in Afghanistan", the Commission stresses on its 'wealth of experience gained in Afghanistan by working with its partners on the ground (currently 26 different organisations) over the last ten years in the humanitarian field, provision of food aid, food security, aid to uprooted people, and demining activities.' In line with needs defined by the international community, the EC has set four priority sectors as part of its strategy.

- **Institutional Support:** to re-establish central and local Government structures;
- **Rural Economy Recovery:** agriculture, livestock, forestry, livelihoods and environment;
- **Social Services:** to make basic health and education services accessible to all;
- **Urban Recovery:** short-term small interventions in urban areas.

In accordance with the priorities, the strategy further details the EC planned expenditure for the year 2002, as follows:

		(in million Euros)
<b>1. Humanitarian Aid through ECHO:</b>		<b>Euros 25 million</b>
<b>2. Extension of on-going activities:</b>		<b>Euros 54 Million</b>
• Food Security	30	
• Aid to Uprooted People	24	
<b>3. "Quick Impact" Package:</b>		<b>Euros 60 Million</b>
• Support to Public Administration	20	
• Rural Recovery	13	
• Mine Action	10	
• Urban Basic Infrastructure	7	
• Information, Coordination & Technical Assistance	10	
<b>4. Additional Reconstruction Activities:</b>		<b>Euros 70 million</b>
A second package to be programmed in the course of 2002, which may serve to reinforce the above activities, to meet additional priorities and/or to contribute to a trust fund		
<b>5. Special Initiatives:</b>		<b>a Possible 3 to 15 million Euros</b>
Which could include human rights, asylum and migration, Rapid Reaction Mechanisms and others if required.		

The EC recognises the important role the NGOs have played in the last 23 years in Afghanistan and the vast experience they have gained, and is aiming to utilise their NGO partners in Afghanistan for most of these activities.

Furthermore, in order to ensure effectiveness and efficiency of their activities, the Commission is planning to establish its offices in Kabul, probably one of its largest bases in the developing world. This office will further enhance the EC operational capacity in Afghanistan. The office is planned to be equipped with seven functionaries and eleven sectoral experts. The Head of Country Office is already in Kabul since 12 February 2002 and will be followed by other colleagues during the coming weeks.

The responsibilities of the sectoral experts include, among others, further up-grading and detailing of the EC knowledge in a number of important areas, such as food security, governance, human rights, gender and the role of women, urban recovery, and education. The experts will build upon the outcome of the World

Bank, UNDP and Asian Development Bank needs assessment from January 2002, which established the basis of the Tokyo Conference for the Trust Fund.

While the EC is planning an annual average contribution of 200 million Euro over the next five years, it is also hoping that additional funds may be made available by the Council, provided peace and security prevails in Afghanistan.

## 5. AFGHANISTAN'S TRANSITION FROM CRISIS TO RECONSTRUCTION AND THE ROLE OF NGOS

### 5.1. SEMINAR PROCEDURES

The seminar was designed in a fashion that will provide a platform to elaborate the strategy, to discuss the implementation mechanisms, and to look at where and how the NGOs can play active and constructive role and to contribute towards the successful implementation of the EC strategy.

Activities included joint panel discussions with EC and NGO representatives, thematic working groups on issues such as emergency relief, food aid and food security and linkages of relief to rehabilitation, such as basic social services. Issues of concern for NGOs included also the changing role of NGOs, the issues of security and access and similar problems related to emergency relief and food aid and food security.

#### 5.1.1. Summary of Main Points from Discussions and Working Groups

Representatives of the European Commission expressed their appreciation for the role NGOs have played in Afghanistan over the last two decades of crisis and welcomed their active involvement in future plans for recovery and rehabilitation. As one EC representative put it: '...the EC cannot reach the communities without NGOs...' The EC strategy states very clearly that '...because of the nature of its implementation allocated and planned funds for the strategy will be mainly implemented through the NGOs...'

**Afghan Involvement in the Processes of Emergency Relief and Rehabilitation:** The EC strategy stresses on the "Afghan Ownership" in all emergency and rehabilitation processes and programmes, with special emphasis on strengthening the capacities and capabilities of Afghan institutions. These include national and local government authorities, the role of the civil society and active participation of local communities in these processes, if efforts by the international aid community is to have lasting and sustainable impact. The NGOs have extensive experience in working closely with the communities, through hiring local staff and collaborating with local NGOs.

Issues discussed in relation to Afghan involvement included:

- Strengthening local and national government capacities, enabling them to take over programmes from NGOs at a later stage;
- Coordinating and cooperating closely with the authorities wherever and whenever possible, following national guidelines and policies;
- Close cooperation and collaboration with local NGOs and exchange of information and experiences, including issues related to capacity building and training needs;
- Specifically designed training programmes for local staff will improve the quality of the on-going and future programmes, but will also increase national and local capacities;
- The role of women in all aspects of emergency relief and rehabilitation must be paid special attention and special activities in the areas of training and female capacity building, job creation and employment, and active involvement and participation in all aspects of social and economic activities;
- Afghan Diaspora, especially those in the neighbouring countries (Iran and Pakistan particularly), should be encouraged to return home and should be inducted in the relief and rehabilitation processes;
- Similarly, ideas and suggestions should be exchanged as to how the Afghan Diaspora in Europe, many of whom are highly qualified, could be encouraged to return back to Afghanistan and to take active part in the rehabilitation and reconstruction processes.

Both the EC and the NGOs agreed that there is need for dialogue to find out a joint approach towards local administration and their active involvement in all processes of recovery and reconstruction.

**Coordination:** All participants agreed that with the steady increase in resources for Afghanistan, the number of organisations and external, as well as internal actors will be increasing further. Therefore, coordination will be a vital instrument to avoid duplication of activities, as well as destructive and negative competition. However, many complained of already being overloaded with coordination meetings. One agency reported that as many as 24 different coordination meetings take place every month. The EC believes that all activities in Afghanistan should be coordinated by the Afghan Government, even if they might need external support for the time being, and it should be Kabul-based. The Interim Government in Afghanistan has recently assigned a highly qualified expatriate Afghan (Dr. Ashraf Ghani) as its Development Coordinator, a move that has been welcomed by the international aid community.

Both the EC and the NGOs agreed that three levels of coordination are essential and these must include:

1. Coordination among the NGOs themselves (Afghan and international NGOs);
2. Coordination between the NGOs and the donor community;
3. Coordination with Afghan Government authorities.

**NGO Involvement in the Implementation of EC Strategy:** The EC confirmed that most of its funds over the last ten years or so have been channeled through the NGOs and it will remain so for the next years too. For instance, ECHO reported that 60% of its budget in 2001 went to NGOs. Similarly, Aid to Uprooted People, an important budget line during the last 15 years, and food aid and food security budgets, have been largely spent in close cooperation with NGOs.

The EC is currently working on procedures to make proposals and approvals easier and faster, in the light of delays and bureaucratic issues many NGOs have been involved in the past. With regard to Afghanistan, the EC is planning to decentralise decision-making and selection criteria from Brussels to its Country Office in Kabul, one reason why the implementation capacity will be expanded towards one of the largest EC offices in developing countries. NGOs suggested that future studies and assessments must concentrate on areas most affected. ‘...assessments carried out in Kabul or Islamabad cannot represent the overall picture in the country...’ stated one NGO representative. Both sides expressed the need for the continuation of dialogue towards strengthening the relationship between the EC and the NGOs with the aim to establish a solid partnership, on the basis of lessons already learned in the past and experiences gained.

**Code of Conduct:** As one EC representative put it: ‘... Afghanistan is in chronic need of institutions and institution building...’ The country has already been drained of its brains, with the vast majority of educated and qualified people living as refugees outside the country.

During the last months the competition on local staff has become a major problem for NGOs, especially for Afghan NGOs. One Afghan NGO reportedly lost 16 staff to the United Nations during the last three weeks alone and an international NGO reported they had to double their staff salary twice in the last two months for fear of losing them to larger international organisations. The NGOs have been developing a Code of Conduct for employment in organisations working in Afghanistan that should be applied by all parties involved in Afghanistan. Therefore, the NGOs requested that the issue of the code of conduct be included in coordination efforts and the EC might use its offices to influence the larger international organisations, especially the UN to apply the code of conduct equally and to respect it once all parties have agreed and signed it.

Many suggest that all NGOs working with EC funds should comply with the code of conduct. Ideally, the Afghan Ministry of Labour should implement the measures, supported by lobbying actions through the EC office for measures to be taken by UN agencies and other international organisations. Measures that have so far been discussed among NGOs include:

- An agreed maximum and minimum wage scale;
- Promotion of learning jobs;
- Minimum budget allocation for education and training of local staff (e.g. 5% of total salary budget-line)
- Monitoring committee to oversee the hiring practices of organisations and publicly expose non-compliant organisations.

**Emergency Relief and its Urgent Need:** While most NGOs’ interest in Afghanistan is the longer-term rehabilitation and reconstruction processes, many stated that it is essential to ensure the survival of many communities, especially those affected by the drought and/or displaced by the US-led bombardments of the

last months. However, NGOs have charted out several areas that require serious attention if emergency relief is to have a lasting effect, including:

- NGOs must be transparent and open about their programmes and activities, as well as their policies and strategies;
- Coordination is essential if overlapping and negative and destructive competition can be avoided;
- Afghan ownership should not only be a lip-service and in the implementation processes, but an objective, also in the decision-making and policy issues;
- Political advocacy should continue through international organisations, especially through the EC for security and access in all major cities and access roads;
- Emergency relief should concentrate on areas most affected and should include instruments to link them to, at least, mid-term recovery and rehabilitation.

**Food Aid and Food Security:** With almost six million people in dire need of basic food supplies, food aid and food security will remain the heart of the problem in Afghanistan over the next couple years. Malnutrition is widely spread throughout the country, particularly among women and children, especially those most affected by the drought and as the result of recent military actions. Sustainability is a strength and added value of NGOs because of their proximity to communities, and the use of local staff as far as possible and available. Several issues have been charted out by the NGOs which might offer the basis for the further development of the EC strategy, such as:

- NGOs have the added value of being also present in the field in rural areas; NGOs are also cost effective, thus offering the best option for funding agencies to make maximum use of NGOs in rural and remote areas;
- Many NGOs have long-standing relations with local communities and have been involved in food aid and food security with some degrees of long term perspective. Use of food aid in Food For Work (FFW) projects should become part of the EC policy to encourage use of food simultaneously for, among others:
  - re-establishing the farming infrastructure, thus creating job opportunities;
  - revitalising social services, such as health and education infrastructure;
  - provision of basic water and sanitation facilities;
  - reconstruction of irrigation facilities;
- Food aid should prioritize on areas most affected and difficult to reach;
- Future food aid projects should be planned appropriately, including more nutritious food items, such as enriched flour, beans, oil, and sugar, instead of cereals only;
- As part of food security, local seed varieties, draught animals and other agriculture incentives should be provided, and the use of machinery that communities may not have access to fuel, repairs and spare parts should be avoided;
- Severe shortages in rural services should be covered through food aid and food security as much as possible;
- Food aid and food security projects should move gradually and systematically from emergency to rehabilitation and stabilisation; these should include elements such as animal husbandry, orchards, rural environmental issues, among others;
- The sustainability of these activities requires NGOs to create jobs opportunities, offer farming communities additional income, and enable communities and local structures to take over responsibility for future projects; these in turn require:
  - Training of community members in appropriate agriculture and animal husbandry methods and systems;
  - Training of local staff in basic issues of farm management and in organisational skills;
  - Training should be carried out at village level and not in the cities, making practical use of on-going activities;
- Security and access lies at the heart of sustainability; security and access for NGOs will also encourage rural population to return back to their home villages, knowing their basic needs will be taken care of by the presence of aid agencies.



**Linking Emergencies to Rehabilitation:** NGOs are aware that emergency aid can adverse development processes if not used appropriately. Therefore, emergency relief must be used in a way that can support, promote and encourage longer-term development processes. Some of the areas where emergency relief could be linked to rehabilitation, especially social services, include:

- Emergency aid should be moved from cities to villages to encourage IDPs to return and to avoid further urban migration from the rural areas;
- Food aid should be used in developing infrastructure, irrigation facilities, rebuild education and health facilities and similar activities;
- Off-farm income should be added to subsistence agriculture through access to markets, income generation projects, and cottage industry, for instance, to substitute the low level of food production and the deteriorating agriculture conditions; any additional survival mechanism will promote farmers to stay away from poppy growing;
- As part of an overall peace-building effort, NGO work should focus on active involvement of youth, along with other cross-cutting issues, such as gender, human rights and environment; the Afghan Diaspora, especially from Iran and Pakistan, should be encouraged to return, not only to the cities, but also to rural areas;
- Use local knowledge, companies, labour and similar groups in all reconstruction activities, with the aim to increase local income, improve the national economy and attract skilled Afghan labour to return home;
- When working on education, special attention should be on teachers and teacher training, for instance using food for work as additional income; school buildings will remain useless without availability of good teachers and appropriate curricula;
- To enable NGOs to be effective and efficient in achieving the above objectives, NGOs suggest the EC should consider the following issues:
  - Allow for NGOs own purchase of food and other relief items;
  - Allow for additional budget-lines required for appropriate implementation of food for work activities;
  - Use of much local skills and labour;
  - Include elements of developing local capacities through training programmes as integrated part of proposals;
- NGOs should make sure that dialogue with the EC is not only on proposals, funding and approvals, but more on contents, policies and strategies, if the existing relationship is to be built-up towards a real partnership.

**Linking Relief and Rehabilitation to Development (LRRD):** EC representatives agreed that the LRRD is a new approach for the EC and they are still looking for instruments and mechanisms to practically implement the new approach. However, the EC also reported that they have been very successful in case of Afghanistan. While it sounds nice in theory, it is much more difficult when it comes to implementation, said one EC representatives. One major issue for LRRD seems to be sound coordination, both at field level (e.g. in Afghanistan) and at the policy level (e.g. in Brussels). Both NGOs and the EC agreed that they should be more concrete about the LRRD and the EC representatives invited suggestions and ideas from the NGO community as to how the approach could best be implemented in the field. Future discussions and dialogue over LRRD should also consider instruments and mechanisms as to how LRRD could best be transferred in the various stages of crisis situations. For instance moving from acute crisis to post-emergency, from post-emergency to recovery and further to stabilisation, that could eventually lead to the longer-term development stage. Responding to concerns expressed by some NGO representatives about the “Quick Impact Projects’ (or Quips), EC representatives stated clearly that any quick impact project should and would be designed with elements of longer-term impact.

## 5.2. OVERVIEW OF NGO PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN

A mapping exercise was carried out as part of the activities for the preparation of the seminar to look at NGO presence in Afghanistan, along four sectors, emergency relief, food security and agriculture, infrastructure and health and education. Because of delays in receiving the relevant information from participating NGOs and often lack of sufficient information, the mapping exercise in its present shape can only be considered as a sort of sample mapping, which could be extended later on.<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless, from the information obtained in such a short-time, several issues became clear during the presentation of the maps, including:

1. **NGO presence in Afghanistan has been closely related to four main factors**
  - Stability and security, for example in the Western provinces, especially Herat;
  - Access and close proximity to neighbouring countries, e.g. Eastern provinces close to borders with Pakistan;
  - Population density, areas around major cities of Kabul, Jalalabad, Herat and Mazar-i-Sharif;
  - Drought affected areas, including the Western regions, Northern areas close to Central Asia Republics and parts of the eastern and Southern provinces.

In addition, after the fall of Taliban and more control of the Northern provinces by the Northern Alliance, a number of new NGOs arrived in the country many of whom have opened offices in Mazar-i-Sharif.

2. **Emergency relief has been mainly concentrating along front-lines**, in areas **most** affected by the drought, and where large concentration of Internally Displaced People (IDPs) has been built up, both during the internal fighting and as a result of last months' US-led bombardments. Areas around Mazar-i-Sharif, Kabul, Jalalabad and Herat have received special attention and concentration, also because of their population density.
3. **Food security and agriculture concentrate mainly in Eastern provinces between** Wardak, Kabul, Jalalabad and Kunar because of long presence of NGOs in those areas and in the West, especially around the triangle Herat-Badghis-Ghor because of political and military stability. For instance, Mazar-i-Sharif changed hands between Taliban and the Northern Alliance, but also between different factions of Northern Alliance, several times from 1994 onwards, while Herat was taken over once by the Taliban in 1995 to remain so until the US-led military operations drove them out of the region.
4. **Infrastructure** has been mainly concentrating around Kabul where authorities were more willing to allow such activities, but mainly because access to material has been easier. However, some infrastructure work, especially repair and maintenance of access roads has been closely linked to food security projects. In the latter case, food security and infrastructure activities have had favorable affects on each other. For instance, while food security activities have enabled continuation on infrastructure through food for work programmes, the continuous repair and maintenance may have had positive impact on regular delivery of food supplies to those regions.
5. **Health and education** activities have been closely linked to the main factors of access, stability and areas around major cities, such in and around Kabul, Herat and Jalalabad

In conclusion, while a number of sectors with NGO involvement have been explored in this exercise, the maps indicated a number of areas within Afghanistan that are not covered at all (at least to the date when mapping information has been delivered!) or very poorly. These include certain provinces in the North and

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<sup>1</sup> Please refer to the annexed mapping table (Section 7.1. of the report), for a description of individual NGO activities in different sectors within Afghanistan.

North-West, especially Samangan, Jowzjan, Qunduz and Faryab; Central, Southern and South-Western provinces, especially Bamyan, Ghazni, Zabul, Oruzgan, Helmand, Nimruz and Eastern provinces of Paktia and Paktika.

Inadequate presence of NGO and NGO activities in Central Afghanistan might be closely linked to the fact that Taliban had firmly sealed off the Hazara population from any external assistance, under a declared economic barricade that has been enforced for almost four years. However, recent reports indicate that more NGOs have since begun to re-launch activities in the region. Paktia and Paktika provinces have always been considered safe because of their proximity to Pakistan and the fact that many male inhabitants travel regularly to Pakistan for work and have easier access to food and other basic supplies. In addition, these two provinces have been mainly dominated by tribal structures, even under Taliban rule, and have not been as severely affected as the other provinces. Finally, the Southern and South-Eastern provinces of Zabul, Hilmand and Oruzgan have often been considered as the strongholds of the Taliban and most organisations might have assumed that the population in these areas might have had more access to food and basic necessities than others. Despite these assumptions, reports from these areas in the years 2000/2001 indicated them as most-affected drought areas. In Kandahar, for instance, a gallon of drinking water was being traded for prices as high as Pak Rs. 40.- (almost one Euro) by early 2001.

### **5.3. CHANGING ROLE OF NGOs**

Over the last two decades, NGOs have rendered unbelievable services in an unbelievable terrain. They have worked hard and have saved many lives. Indeed as one of our EC colleagues put it: “if it was not for the NGO work, many more lives would have been lost in Afghanistan!”

NGOs had taken over many roles usually played by the governments, from health to education, from food aid to reconstruction, almost every aspect of relief and rehabilitation. But now this unique role is about to change. With the presence of a legal and internationally recognised government, though still weak in capacities and capabilities, NGOs will have to work with the government, but also with the rest of the international community involved in the recovery and rehabilitation processes in Afghanistan. One hopes that unlike other developing countries where governments and NGOs are rather foes, in Afghanistan enough effort will be made to make the relationship one of friendship and cooperation. For at the end of the day it is the present and future Afghan governments that have to take responsibility for their people.

The civil society, to which the Afghan NGOs are an important part, should be given sufficient room to grow up in capacities and capabilities to be able to respond to the needs of their own communities, and to fill the gaps that may be left by the government.

#### **Changing Responsibilities: The New Government/NGO Interface for Development in Afghanistan (From Novib address by Jurjen van der Tas)**

In the Afghan context the expression “recovery” is perhaps misleading. Even before the war Afghanistan was an underdeveloped country with a limited infrastructure and with even the most basic facilities lacking in rural areas. “Recovery” as a development objective in today’s Afghan context, therefore would be defined as not just restoring what used to be there, but rather as: “an attempt to gain and maintain a standard of living that will allow citizens to have access to basic social services, to a sustainable livelihood, to security and justice and that will give them the right to social and political participation and equity”.

Aspects such as “Afghan ownership”, which is frequently mentioned by nearly all agencies involved, including the IFIs, UNDP and which is also mentioned in the EC strategy document, should be seen as more than a guiding principle for a strategy only. One would argue that Afghan ownership should be treated as an objective in its own right and the Afghan civil society should be treated as serious partners and not simply as delivery agents.

Capacity building of NGOs has been taking place at various levels and has to a large degree followed the needs from the field. Thus it is no surprise that the IDA Needs Assessment for Recovery and

Reconstruction around which most of the pledging in Tokyo took place, but also the EC strategy paper, follows almost the same priority themes and sectors and so-called “cross-cutting issues”, as the NGOs have collectively been addressing over the years.

The announcement by Mr Karzai in early January of the creation of a Government NGO/Committee under the Ministry of Planning was genuinely welcomed by most NGOs. The NGOs and the Government have to create a new interface and decide where respective responsibilities start and end. There is widespread agreement that things cannot remain as they were and that, particularly in the field of Food Security, Emergencies and Basic Social Services, the Government will have to take major responsibilities for standardisation, policy development and nation-wide coverage. For the NGOs there will still be major tasks in these fields. In other sectors such as infrastructure, de-mining, agricultural development and credit, Government influence at implementation level may be limited and NGOs may continue to grow and prosper.

In summary, we should see the possibilities ahead of us with a degree of caution, but that this should not dampen the optimism there is to make use of the current situation and bring lasting development to Afghanistan.

**Running with us are:**

- The existence of a civil society in Afghanistan (although it may not always be recognised as such by outsiders)
- Goodwill amongst the population and expectations for a better future
- Limited enthusiasm for armed solutions among the people at large
- International attention and coverage (for the time being)
- Availability of know-how and from Afghans working abroad and living in the Diaspora
- A rudimentary system for providing Basic Social Services (but one that is based on dedication and voluntarism and therefore has good outlooks)

**What could be running against us are:**

- Continued lack of security in areas outside the urban centres
- Confusing roles of military involved with humanitarian aid
- Fatigue amongst Afghans about the roles of the UN and NGOs, as a result of too much supervision
- Cultural insensitivities which may lead to hostilities
- Time: if goods and services are not delivered timely, all goodwill will evaporate.

**Summary of Discussions:** Participants agreed that Afghan ownership should be pursued through three main paths:

1. Work closely with the Central Government and, as far available, with local authorities and strengthen their capacities to take over responsibility;
2. Help to bring about associational life and civic society to the communities, through intensive support to local Afghan NGOs, by strengthening their existing capacities;
3. Make appropriate use of local traditional structures, while respecting social and cultural values and sensitivities, but also understanding their limitations.

**Stabilisation of Afghanistan’s state is key to peace and future prosperity**, but also to reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts made by the international aid community. While NGOs have worked in isolation from Afghan authorities in the last two decades, it remains open as to how the NGO community is going to make this move from independence to working with Government. Therefore, it is highly recommended that specific mechanisms be worked out in this regard by the NGO community. The role of NGOs should largely be seen in filling the gaps that government authorities may not be able to respond to, and to represent the civil society.

Working and collaborating with local NGOs means involving them in all aspects of relief and reconstruction processes, such as assessments, planning, implementation, but far more in decision-making and policy processes. This will require international NGOs and bilateral and multilateral agencies to accept and respect norms and regulations that can most benefit Afghan NGOs, for instance, the code of conduct for employment, **inclusion of Afghan NGOs in major decision-making and in overall coordination.**

Local, traditional structures at the community level have most appropriately been used for local decision-making on a variety of local issues, from water distribution to land ownership conflicts, and from matters related to justice required at the local level to community work, such as *Ashar* (an equivalent to Food For Work, when building house or working in the farms). However, local structures, such as *Shras* and *Jirgas* have often been corrupted and abused by power structures for their own political purposes. Similarly, during the 1980s, many aid agencies have misemployed local structures, often because they did not understand them properly or because they were misled by others, including the warlords. Furthermore, at their best, local structures miss a number of important issues that are vital to societal development as a whole, such as the inclusion of women and minority groups in the meetings and in decision-making processes. Therefore, NGOs need to **understand both the strengths and weaknesses of local structures** and must understand how to use them appropriately. It was, consequently, suggested that a special project be designed for social studies to find out more about communities and their structures in Afghanistan and how they could be best used in the reconstruction and rehabilitation processes.

## 6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### 6.1. CONCLUSIONS

1. The European Commission is satisfied with the **political processes** and international commitment from Bonn to Tokyo. They are results of compromises made by, both, the Afghans and the international community. However, Afghanistan's Interim Government structures are quite weak beyond Kabul. Even the future provisional government will require an immense amount of support and institution building to be able to respond fully to the communities needs on its own. Consequently, the European Union as a whole and the EC in particular have made a longer-term commitment to the reconstruction and rehabilitation processes of Afghanistan.  
The European Commission believes that recovery and **rehabilitation processes in Afghanistan must go slowly, but sustainably**. And funds will only be available if peace agreement holds. In addition, the EC has attached a number of other conditionalities, such as appropriate use of resources, coordination, monitoring and cross cutting issues, especially gender and human rights, to be respected.
2. The EC strategy contains certain elements that are very encouraging for NGOs. These include **NGO involvement, prioritising certain sectors**. For instance, rural development and urban development have been given equal importance, **cross cutting issues**, such as gender and human rights are seen as essential elements, and support to reestablish the government institutions at national, provincial and local levels. While additional sectoral studies and assessments are planned to be carried out by the EC expert team during the month of March 2002, it is hoped that elements of geographical priorities be also considered. As a result, areas most affected from recent drought and military actions may fall under geographical priority and might receive special attention.
3. As outside support to the warlords continue to flow, **security outside Kabul** is a serious problem and can have negative consequences. Similarly, the slow deployment of UN forces is worrying for many member-states and the EC and could have additional impact on the recovery and reconstruction processes, but it can also affect the fragile peace.  
**Security** is a major problem in reaching the most affected people and main roads are regularly subject to banditry and looting of humanitarian aid. The Afghan Interim Government must have access to appropriate budgets to establish political, judicial and economic frameworks and plans as soon as possible. The EC can step in as **honest broker** also in terms of financial assistance and support in building up appropriate army and civil administration.
4. **Afghan ownership** of the recovery and reconstruction processes is a vital instrument of sustainability and can re-enforce the further development of political process. While international NGOs are already working in cooperation with local NGOs, this cooperation must be extended to the Afghan government too. NGOs do understand that the final responsibility for the well-being of population lies eventually with **the Afghan Government** and the **civil society**. Similarly, **active participation** and involvement of the affected **communities** is equally important if programmes are to have lasting impact. Therefore, all three levels of ownership, the Government, the civil society and the communities should be considered in the planning, implementation and decision-making processes. Afghan ownership also requires a set of **guidelines and rules** that should be accepted and respected by all actors in the emergency and rehabilitation programmes.
5. **Afghan involvement** is not only essential in coordination, but also in all other aspects of **decision-making**. However, the present Interim Government lacks sufficient capacities to extend its services beyond Kabul and non-governmental Afghan organisations (NGOs) have limited capacity to handle the crisis on their own. Consequently, institution building requires serious attention at all levels.
6. **Community empowerment and development** must be on top of the NGO agenda and every effort must be made to ensure active participation of communities in all aspects of decision-making processes. In order to avoid dependency, every effort must be made **to link emergency relief to**

**longer-term sustainable development** needs of the Afghan communities, as a policy instrument. Proposals and plans must include elements of community empowerment, capacity building and sustainability, such as food production, job creation and employment opportunities, sustainable agriculture and other economic practices, by using, for instance, food aid and food security programmes appropriately. Special attention should be paid to rural areas to avoid further urbanisation of rural communities and to attract IDPs and refugees to return to their home villages. Likewise, food aid, if used appropriately, could enable communities to re-establish rural infrastructure, including health and education facilities.

7. The large concentration of international organisations in Afghanistan will be a big challenge for everyone, especially for the Afghan authorities. It is hoped that the “Balkanisation” of Afghanistan can be avoided through **sensible and responsible coordination**. Transparency and openness lies at the heart of responsible coordination. Overall coordination of recovery and rehabilitation processes are vital for both the international community and the Afghan authorities. Despite its weaknesses, the Afghan Government must be provided the opportunity to take this responsibility.
8. **Generally** VOICE and EuronAid and their membership are **interested in the longer-term recovery and rehabilitation of Afghanistan**. However, this first year is essential for Afghanistan to come out of the humanitarian crisis. Millions of people both within and outside Afghanistan are in dire need of basic necessities, such as food and shelter. Therefore, **emergency relief** will play an important role in the processes of recovery. **Food aid** will be still required for the next 2-3 years, as communities begin to rebuild their livelihoods and reestablish a sustainable agricultural system that can guarantee them sufficient food production. Therefore, **food security** will be at the heart of the problem for the **next years** to come.
9. **Emergency relief and rehabilitation and development processes in Afghanistan must go hand in hand**. Relief and rehabilitation programmes must have linkages to longer-term development needs of the country and the communities we work with.  
**Linking Relief and Rehabilitation to Development (LRRD)** is a new approach for the EC, while NGOs have a good understanding and apply the approach already in the field. However, the approach has been quite successful in Afghanistan and the Commission would like to learn more from the NGOs. The EC will appreciate any concrete proposal or suggestion in this regard and will expect the NGO community to approach them with a **common strategy** for LRRD.
10. NGOs felt that the Tokyo Conference did not take NGO experience serious, despite their two decades of experience and active involvement, often under very difficult circumstances. NGOs have gained a wealth of experience in all these year, where many bilateral and multilateral agencies had to pull out often because of political and/or military implications. Both the EC and the EU member states have recognised the important role of NGOs in their future plans in Afghanistan.  
The NGOs appreciate the efforts made by the responsible units within the Commission to include NGO involvement, while preparing the draft strategy. The NGOs believe this cooperation and consultation is the beginning of a new era of relationship between the EC and NGOs for a lasting partnership, especially in the complex situation of Afghanistan.
11. **Partnership** and dialogue between **NGOs and the EC** must be strengthened through increased exchange of information and experiences, especially the flow of feedback from the field.  
While this seminar has been a first step towards exchange of views and opinions regarding the EC strategy in Afghanistan, a mechanism should be established to **review and evaluate** the events and **developments regularly**, at least annually. Such mechanisms can provide a platform to evaluate whether assumptions and indicators are still valid and whether the strategies and policies can still be applied.
12. In the past, NGOs have faced certain delays and problems in issues related to **EC procedures**, such as selection of proposals, approval, and coordination of funding that may have caused delays in the

implementation of activities. The EC is currently working on a new set of procedures that are **faster and less bureaucratic**, including transparency.

It is hoped that future programmes in Afghanistan will face less delays and problems and more flexibility of funding to allow also in practice a better LLRD approach. In addition, with the establishment of an extensive EC office in Kabul, selection criteria and decision-making will be **de-concentrated** and should speed up decision-making.

## 6.2. FINDINGS

1. The European Commission appreciates this seminar at this important junction. As the **EC strategy** has strong elements of **NGO involvement**, it is important that a basis for dialogue between the EC and NGOs can be established. Consequently, it is hoped that future policies and strategies are shared with the NGOs and sufficient consultation and dialogue is used to make maximum use of NGO experience in the field and their added values.
2. Regional issues play an important role in Afghanistan and its stability and similar gatherings are necessary to also discuss regional issues in the near future.
3. With regard to Afghan Ownership, it is highly recommended to **establish a platform**, where a **joint approach** can be developed **towards local administration**, as well as towards Afghan NGOs, community organisations and traditional **social structures**. Furthermore, it is recommended (I would prefer here) “that development operators study in depth existence and functions of various **traditional structures** and how best those can be adapted and appropriately used in the rehabilitation and reconstruction processes.
4. The EC and the NGO community strongly recommended that the **Kabul-based coordination** of relief and rehabilitation efforts should be chaired by the Afghan Government, even if they might require external assistance and support. In order to enable the Afghan authorities and the civil society to respond responsibly to the needs of their communities, **institution and capacity building and training activities** must become an integrated **part of recovery and reconstruction** programmes.
5. **National policies** are not a matter for NGOs and they must keep out of those issues, concentrating on and respecting their international mandate of humanitarianism. Therefore, it is essential that all NGOs apply the **international code of conduct** for humanitarian agencies; link with appropriate responsible authorities; and to respond to the aspirations of the communities.
6. The European Commission should use its influence on international organisations, such as the UN to accept and sign, but also to respect and apply the code of conduct for employment of local staff, once it has been agreed upon. **VOICE and EuronAid should follow-up** these issues with both the EC offices and the NGOs.
7. For NGOs to be able to timely reach the most affected people, **security and access** are paramount. Therefore, the NGOs recommend an intensive **political lobbying** must be carried out, using the Commission to put pressure on the UN and the international community to extended the mandate of international peace-keeping forces beyond Kabul. The mandate should, ideally, be also extended into peace-enforcing, if need be.
8. While larger **international organisations** will concentrate their efforts on **Kabul and other major cities**, **NGOs are out in the rural areas** and will be working closely with rural communities. Therefore, the EC should **consider the NGOs as their best partners** in the implementation of the strategy for Afghanistan. This should be clearly reflected in the final draft of the strategy, along with the role NGOs can play in the overall strategy and specific funding allocations to NGOs.



9. Clarification of LRRD and its appropriate implementation will help to prevent failure in “Quick Impact Projects” (or Quips) and will ensure such projects will have longer-term impact on the communities. It is, therefore, recommended that a **working group** be set-up between the EC and NGOs through VOICE and EuronAid to further discuss implementation and application mechanisms for **LRRD** in EC-funded projects. These should include modus operandi for LRRD transfer from one stage to another, e.g. from acute crisis to post-emergency, and further to recovery and stabilisation.
10. Several issues have been discussed at the seminar that will require **follow-up**. Therefore, the NGO community recommended that VOICE and EuronAid take it as their responsibility, on behalf of their membership, to follow up these issues and to ensure sufficient consultation will take place with the membership and final decisions will be shared with them. These include: clarification of the **Linkages from Relief and Rehabilitation to Development (LRRD)**; devises and mechanisms to ensure **Afghan ownership** on the side of the NGOs; acceptance of and respect for the final draft of **code of conduct for employment** within aid agencies in Afghanistan; **political lobbying** to pressurise the international community, especially the United Nations to extend the mandate of the international peace-keeping forces beyond Kabul, as **security and access** to rural areas is essential for NGOs to reach the communities mostly affected.

### 6.3. RECOMMENDATIONS

**The seminar brought together a wealth of NGO expertise, knowledge and experience in the field in Afghanistan. For its part, the EC recognised the importance of sustained substantive input from NGOs into the EC’s strategic planning in Brussels, as well as input into practical implementation in the field. The NGOs welcomed this exchange of perspectives and experiences.**

On this basis, the seminar reached the following recommendations.

#### EC-NGO Partnership at Strategic Level

- **NGO Priorities:** given the NGO expertise and practical knowledge particularly in rural areas, NGO positions should be clearly reflected and integrated into the EC strategy for Afghanistan, along with the role NGOs can play in the overall strategy and specific funding allocations to NGOs
- **Information exchange:** a formal mechanism of information/experience exchange, meeting at least annually, should be established to facilitate consultation and dialogue on EC future policies and strategies, benefiting from the NGO’s immense amount of experience, especially in working with rural communities.
- **Working Group:** a working group should be set-up between the EC and NGOs through VOICE and EURONAIID to incorporate an Afghan centred approach and avoid adverse effects from “Quick Impact Projects” (or Quips) on a longer-term developmental approach (see below), the results of which can feed into the EC Strategy
- **Delays:** delays relating to EC procedures, such as selection of proposals, approval, and coordination of funding, should be removed so that procedures are faster, less bureaucratic and more flexible, and more transparent

#### EC Strategy in the field : the most immediate concerns

- **Food aid/security:** in order to move from humanitarian crisis to rehabilitation phase, food aid/security have to be at the heart of the recovery and rehabilitation activities during the next years, concentrating on areas most affected as communities begin to rebuild their livelihoods and re-establish a sustainable agricultural system that can guarantee them sufficient food production
- **Food For Work:** the EC strategy should use food aid in Food For Work (FFW) projects availing of long-standing NGO experience in the domain, with the sustainable knock-on effect of creating jobs opportunities, offering farming communities additional income, and enabling communities and local structures to take over responsibility for future projects

### EC Strategy and Afghan ownership

- *Afghan ownership: the EC Strategy should include as an objective Afghan ownership of the recovery and reconstruction process; the strategy, and the role played therein by international NGOs, should be informed by the understanding that such empowerment is a crucial attempt in the longer-term perspective to Link Relief and Rehabilitation to Development (LRRD)*
- *Participation: if programmes are to have lasting impact and contribute to a sustainable political process, means to concretise Afghan ownership of the process should actively include all three levels of ownership –at the level of Government, civil society and communities– in the planning, implementation and decision-making processes*
- **Co-ordination:** to facilitate empowerment and allow traditional structures to be taken into account, the Afghan government should also be provided the opportunity despite its weakness to take on a co-ordinating role, namely as chair of the Kabul-based coordination of relief and rehabilitation efforts, creating one umbrella over local and international NGOs as well as international organisations and local authorities
- **Capacity building:** in order to enable the weakened Afghan authorities and civil society to be able to responsibly respond to the needs of their communities and to rise to the challenge of sensible and responsible co-ordination based on transparency and openness, institution and capacity building and training programmes must become an integrated part of recovery and reconstruction programmes

### Security and access at the heart of sustainability

- **Peacekeeping:** In order to ensure access to areas of most need, and to encourage rural populations to return back to their home villages with guarantees of security, the EC is called upon to use all available means to persuade the UN and other actors to bring about an extension of the mandate of the international peace-keeping forces beyond Kabul, given the implicit understanding that humanitarian and military aid should be kept separate.

### Code of Conduct

- **NGO personnel:** the European Commission should use its influence on international organisations, such as the UN to accept and sign, but also to respect and apply the code of conduct for employment of local staff, once it has been agreed upon to prevent the undermining of NGO activity by the poaching of staff with the incentive of higher salaries.

## 6.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

**Le séminaire a permis de rassembler un grand nombre d'expériences et de connaissances acquises par les ONG concernant l'Afghanistan. Pour sa part, la CE reconnaît l'importance de l'apport technique constant apporté par les ONG à la planification stratégique de la CE, à Bruxelles, et de leur contribution à la mise en pratique dans la région. Les ONG se félicitent de cet échange de perspectives et d'expériences.**

Sur cette base, le séminaire a abouti aux recommandations suivantes.

### **Collaboration CE-ONG au plan stratégique**

- **Priorités des ONG:** compte tenu de l'expérience et des connaissances pratiques acquises par les ONG dans les zones rurales, les positions des ONG doivent être clairement indiquées et intégrées dans la stratégie de la CE pour l'Afghanistan, conjointement avec le rôle que les ONG peuvent jouer dans la stratégie globale et les affectations de fonds spécifiques aux ONG
- **Echange d'informations:** un mécanisme officiel d'échange d'informations / expériences, intervenant au moins une fois par an, devrait être mis en place afin de faciliter la consultation et le dialogue sur les politiques et stratégies futures de la CE, en tirant profit de l'immense expérience acquise par les ONG, en particulier dans le travail avec des communautés rurales.
- **Groupe de travail:** un groupe de travail devrait être créé entre la CE et les ONG par VOICE et EURONAIID afin d'intégrer une approche axée sur l'Afghanistan et d'éviter les effets pervers des "Projets à impact rapide" (ou Quips) sur une approche du développement à plus long terme (voir ci-dessous), dont les résultats pourront alimenter la stratégie de la CE
- **Retards:** les retards liés aux procédures de la CE, tels que la sélection des propositions, l'approbation et la coordination des financements, doivent être éliminés afin que les procédures soient plus rapides, moins bureaucratiques, plus souples et plus transparentes

### **Stratégie de la CE dans la région : les préoccupations les plus urgentes**

- **Aide / sécurité alimentaire:** afin de passer de la crise humanitaire à la phase de réhabilitation, l'aide / la sécurité alimentaire doivent être au cœur des activités de relance et de réhabilitation au cours des années à venir, en se concentrant sur les régions les plus touchées étant donné que les communautés commencent à récupérer leurs moyens de subsistance et à rétablir un système agricole durable capable de leur garantir une production alimentaire suffisante
- **Food For Work:** la stratégie de la CE doit recourir à l'aide alimentaire fournie par les projets Food For Work (FFW) en tirant profit de la longue expérience des ONG dans ce domaine, associée à l'effet de contagion durable lié à la création de perspectives d'emploi, aux revenus supplémentaires des communautés rurales et en permettant aux communautés et aux structures locales d'assumer une responsabilité dans de futurs projets

### **Stratégie de la CE et prise en charge par les Afghans**

- *Prise en charge par les Afghans: la stratégie de la CE doit permettre aux Afghans de prendre en charge le processus de relance et de reconstruction; la stratégie et le rôle joués dans ce contexte par les ONG internationales doivent être inspirés par le fait qu'une telle prise en charge constitue une tentative essentielle dans une perspective à plus long terme qui s'inscrit dans le cadre des liens existant entre l'aide d'urgence, la réhabilitation et le développement (LRRD)*
- *Participation: pour que les programmes aient un impact durable et contribuent à un processus politique durable, les moyens permettant aux Afghans de prendre le processus en charge*

*doivent impérativement inclure les trois niveaux de participation – le gouvernement, la société civile et les communautés– dans les processus de planification, d'exécution et de prise de décision*

- **Coordination:** afin de faciliter la prise en charge et de permettre la prise en compte des structures traditionnelles, le gouvernement afghan doit également avoir la possibilité, en dépit de ses faiblesses, d'assumer un rôle de coordination à Kaboul, en dirigeant les actions d'aide et de réhabilitation et en créant une tutelle sur les ONG locales et internationales ainsi que les organisations internationales et les autorités locales
- **Création de capacités:** afin de permettre aux autorités afghanes affaiblies et à la société civile de faire face sérieusement aux besoins de leur communauté et d'assurer une coordination réaliste et responsable basée sur la transparence et l'ouverture, la création de capacités et les programmes de formation doivent devenir partie intégrante des programmes de relance et de reconstruction.

#### **Sécurité et accès au cœur de la durabilité**

- **Maintien de la paix:** afin d'assurer l'accès aux régions les plus défavorisées et d'encourager les populations locales à retourner dans leur village natal avec des garanties de sécurité, la CE est invitée à utiliser tous les moyens disponibles pour persuader les Nations Unies et d'autres acteurs de prolonger le mandat des forces de maintien de la paix au-delà de Kaboul, étant entendu implicitement que l'aide humanitaire et militaire doivent être séparées.

#### **Code de Conduite**

- **Personnel des ONG:** la Commission européenne devrait user de son influence sur les organisations internationales, telles que les Nations Unies, pour les inciter à accepter et à signer, mais aussi à respecter et à appliquer le code de conduite en matière d'emploi du personnel local, lorsqu'il aura été accepté, afin d'éviter de miner l'activité de l'ONG en débauchant le personnel par l'attrait de salaires élevés.

## **7. ANNEXES**

## 7.1. MAPPING TABLE OF NGO ACTIVITIES IN AFGHANISTAN

Organisation	Sector	Speciality	Province	Activities	Present since	Source of funding
<b>ACTED</b>	Emergency relief Infrastructure Food security	- Relief and infrastructure rehabilitation of conflict affected areas	Panjshir Valley & Shamali Plain Western Baghlan Northern Takhar & Kunduz	Multi-faceted support activities to IDPs and returnees: - Demining - Shelter - Agriculture - Irrigation - Water supply - Food aid - Income Generation - Access - Small scale infrastructure	1994	
<b>ADRA</b>	Emergency relief	- Emergency Relief - Rehabilitation (planned)	Between Kabul and Jalalabad	- Distribution of relief goods: mattresses, blankets, medicine, soap, etc.	1998	- German Government - Church and private donations
<b>AFGHAN AID</b>	Emergency relief Infrastructure Basic social services Food Security	- Emergency Relief - Rehabilitation - Agriculture and natural resources - Income generation - Health - Roads (FFW)	Badakhshan Nuristan Ghor	Community-based development through Village Organisations: - Distribution of food for winterization - Supplementary feeding for IDPs in Eastern provinces (Nangahar, Badakhshan, Kabul) - Food for work - Set up of women resource centers - Health education programmes with women - Irrigation schemes - Distribution of seeds and fertilisers - Veterinary programme - Extension advice	1983	- EC - DFID - WFP (food-for-work)
<b>AKF /FOCUS</b>	Emergency relief Infrastructure Basic social services Food Security	- Agriculture and natural resources - Water and sanitation - Rehabilitation - Food Security Planned: - Education - Infrastructure	Badakhshan  Baghlan	- Food for Seed Extension Services	1996	- EC - DFID - US - CIDA - Private funds

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Organisation	Sector	Speciality	Province	Activities	Present since	Source of funding
<b>AMI (Aide Médicale Internationale)</b>	Infrastructure Basic social services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Health</li> <li>- Infrastructure</li> </ul>	Laghman/Larman/Konar in the East	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- In the East they are working in 3 hospitals and 5 health centres (support) + nutrition programme there.</li> </ul>	1979	-
			Kabul/Lowgar	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Rehabilitation of the hospitals, support to the central laboratory</li> </ul>		
			Pandchir Valley	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Support to 6 health centres</li> </ul>		
			Balkh/Samangan/Bamian in the North	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Mobile clinics</li> </ul>		
<b>ASB</b>	Emergency relief	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Emergency relief (refugee camps)</li> </ul> <p>Planned:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Reconstruction (in which they are specialised -Balkans +Iraq).</li> </ul>	<p>Northern Afghanistan operating via Tajikistan: Iman Sachib region.</p> <p>Plans to establish an office either in Kabul or in the Northern part of Afghanistan.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Some of the projects implemented in cooperation with Care-Germany</li> <li>- Main target of aid are several refugee camps in the Iman Sachib region. It estimates some 50.000 refugees in these camps</li> <li>- So far they delivered food (High Protein Biscuits, Oil) and blankets. Plans to extend these deliveries in the close future.</li> </ul>		
<b>CAD</b>	Basic social services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Supplementary feeding – nutrition Programme for children under 5 and breastfeeding mothers</li> <li>- Primary Health Care</li> </ul>	<p>Takhar Kunduz</p> <p><i>(Tajikistan)</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Want to develop their interventions in Takhar and Kunduz</li> <li>- They have a little project now on in Takhar (nutritive biscuits)</li> </ul>	After Sept, 11. Opening of an Office in January	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- ECHO</li> <li>- DFID</li> <li>- UNICEF</li> <li>- Gave proposals to ECHO for funding + UK + UNICEF</li> </ul>

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Organisation	Sector	Speciality	Province	Activities	Present since	Source of funding
CAFOD	Emergency relief Infrastructure	- Emergency relief - Income/ Employment generation - Infrastructure	- South Kandahar - Kabul  - North provinces	- Distribution of food and non-food items to IDPs - Cash for work programmes and food distribution	Sept 2001	- UK Government - Private donations
CARE	Emergency relief Infrastructure Basic social services Food Security	- Social protection for vulnerable groups (security of livelihood for returnees) - Infrastructure rehabilitation (irrigation)  - Education  - Relief emergency  - Water and sanitation - Drought mitigation	Wardak Ghazni  Wardak Ghazni  Logar  Gardez Khost  Logar Maidan  Ghazni  Paktika Shamali Kabul  Kabul  Farah  Qandahar Zabul Badghis Herat Kabul	- Rural rehabilitation  - Drought assistance: Irrigation systems repairs and improvement  - Community organized primary education  - Food assistance - Free food distribution to Widows (health instruction)  - Food assistance	1960s-1980  1989- present	- EC - OFDA  - Care US - CIDA  - Margridge/ Tosa Foundation - CIDA III - Private donations  - OFDA - CIDA  - OFDA - WFP - ECHO

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Organisation	Sector	Speciality	Province	Activities	Present since	Source of funding
<b>CARITAS GERMANY</b>	Emergency relief Infrastructure Basic social services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Emergency relief</li> <li>- Infrastructure</li>   <li>- Health</li> </ul> Planned: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Emergency relief</li>   <li>- Drug victim rehabilitation</li> <li>- Mine victims Rehabilitation</li> </ul>	Kabul, Herat Kabul  Mazar-I-sharif <i>Hazarajat</i>  <i>Hazarajat</i>  <b>Kabul, Jalalabad region</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Rehabilitation of schools and distribution of food to school girls through winter</li> <li>- Lepracy and TB – ongoing project</li>   <li>- Distribution of clothes and food</li> <li>- Support to ex-poppy farmers</li> <li>- Support to the handicapped</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- German Government</li> <li>- Own funds</li> <li>- Private donations</li> </ul>
<b>CESVI</b>	Basic social services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Rehabilitation</li> </ul>	Mainly north (Takhar) To open office soon in Mazar-I-Sharif	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Rehabilitation of schools for 3000 children (particular support to refugees)</li> </ul>	October 2001	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- UNHCR</li> <li>- Own funds</li> </ul>
<b>CHRISTIAN AID</b>	Emergency relief Infrastructure Basic social services Food Security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Health</li> <li>- Agriculture and natural resources</li> <li>- Income/ employment generation</li> <li>- Rehabilitation</li> <li>- Food security</li>   <li>- Emergency relief</li> </ul>	Herat Badghis Farah Faryab  Ghor  Balkh Kabul	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Primary and secondary health care services</li> <li>- Health infrastructure</li> <li>- Animal husbandry</li> <li>- Support to farmers</li> <li>- Vocational training</li> <li>- Credit</li> <li>- Rehabilitation of production infrastructure</li> <li>- Food for work</li> <li>- Support to displaced people</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- DFID</li> <li>- EuropeAid (uprooted people)</li> <li>- ARGA</li> <li>- Afghanaid</li> </ul>
<b>CIR</b>	Emergency relief	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Emergency Assistance to the displaced and refugees</li> </ul>	Northern region Balkh Province (surroundings Mazar-I-Sharif)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Emergency assistance to the displaced in the Northern Region</li> <li>- Emergency assistance to the Refugees in New Sakhi Camp</li> <li>- Emergency coordination programme</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- ECHO (for the 2 projects)</li> </ul>

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Organisation	Sector	Speciality	Province	Activities	Present since	Source of funding
<b>COOPI</b>	Emergency relief Basic social services	- Health	Bala Murghab, Badghis Province.	- Intervention: Community-Based Primary Health Care Programme number of beneficiaries: 60.000	January 2001	- CIDA; MSF
		- Emergency relief	Takhar	- Intervention: IDPs assistance, non-food item distribution number of beneficiaries: 25.448		- Governative funds- decentralized co-operation
			Herat , Mazar-e-Sharif	- Intervention: IDPs assistance, no-food item distribution, water & sanitation number of beneficiaries: 38.500		- Governative funds - decentralized co-operation,
<b>CONCERN WORLWIDE</b>	Emergency relief Infrastructure Food Security	- Emergency/ Relief - Agriculture and natural resources - Housing and urban services - Roads - Gender	Badakhshan  Baghlan  Takhar  (Assessing viability of establishing programmes in Bamian and Kandahar)	- food security of most vulnerable communities through FFW, FoodAc interventions, rehabilitation of roads and irrigation systems - non food item delivery, shelter rehabilitation intervention. - Planning to strengthen tgender focus, particularly female headed households.	1998	- Irish government - British government - American government - Echo - UNOCHA - Public donations

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Organisation	Sector	Speciality	Province	Activities	Present since	Source of funding
<b>CORDAID</b>	Emergency relief Basic social services Food Security Infrastructure	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Health care</li> <li>- Distribution to IDPs, returnees and vulnerable persons</li> <li>- Water supply</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Kandahar, Helmand, Bamyan, Wardak, Ghazni, Nangahar, Laghman, Paktika, Paktia</li> <li>- Kandahar, Nangarhar, Ghazni, Bamyan</li> <li>- Kandahar, Herat, Nimroz, Zabul</li> <li>- Helmand</li> <li>- Heart, kandahar, Bamyan, Ghazni, Nangarhar, Uruzgan</li> <li>- Ghazni</li> <li>- Jowzjan</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Health care services: clinics, maternity homes, nurses training</li> <li>- Mobile clinics</li> <li>- Distribution of food and non-food items</li> <li>- Provision of shelter and coal stoves IDPs</li> <li>- Distribution of food and tarpaulins</li> <li>- Supplementary food</li> <li>- Rehabilitation Karezes and digging deep wells</li> <li>- Irrigation water and agricultural inputs</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Caritas Network: Irish Aid, DFID, Belgian Gov, Spanish Gov</li> <li>- EU</li> <li>- Cordaid funds</li> <li>- Dutch Gov</li> </ul>

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Organisation	Sector	Speciality	Province	Activities	Present since	Source of funding
<b>DACAAR</b>	Emergency relief Infrastructure Basic social services Food Security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Water and sanitation</li> <li>- Agriculture and natural resources</li> <li>- Housing and urban services</li> <li>- Local governance and community driven development</li> <li>- Income/ employment generation</li> </ul>	Badghis Farah Ghazni Ghor Helmand Herat Kabul Khost Konar Laghman Nangarhar Nimroz Paktia Paktika Qandahar Uruzgan Wardak Zabul	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Water supply: hand pumps, dug and tube wells, pipe schemes, sanitation, hygiene education</li> <li>- Integrated agricultural development: irrigation, water and natural resource management, applied research, community organization</li> <li>- Building: school and clinic construction, school repair, beam production</li> <li>- Hand pump factory, sewing center</li> <li>- Distribution of food and non-food items, drought response activities</li> </ul>	1984 – support for refugees in Pakistan 1989 – reconstruction work	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- DANIDA</li> <li>- EC AIDCO</li> <li>- ECHO</li> <li>- ACT</li> <li>- Netherlands</li> <li>- UNHCR</li> <li>- WFP</li> </ul>
<b>DUTCH COMMITTEE</b>	Food Security	Planned: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Food Security</li> <li>- Animal husbandry</li> </ul>	Almost country wide	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Vaccination programme: running a cold chain of animal vaccines from supplier to stores in Afghanistan</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Preceding livestock programme with FAO</li> </ul>
<b>DWHH/ GAA</b>	Emergency relief Basic social services Food Security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Food Security</li> <li>- Agriculture and natural resources</li> <li>- Emergency relief</li> <li>- Water and sanitation</li> </ul>	Balkh Jawzjan Sar-e-Pul Faryab Badghiz Heart Wardak Kabul - (surroundings) Nangarhar Kunar	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Distribution of food packages to drought-stricken families</li> <li>- Irrigation</li> <li>- Provision of agricultural inputs such as wheat seed, fertilizer and tillage facilities.</li> <li>- Extension services</li> </ul>	1985 Established office in 1993	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- German Government</li> <li>- EU</li> <li>- Own funding</li> </ul>

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Organisation	Sector	Speciality	Province	Activities	Present since	Source of funding
Handicap	Food security	- de-mining	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Southern Afghanistan: Kandahar + 5 others</li> <li>- Now withdrawn in their Quetta office (South East).</li> </ul>	Since the reinforcement of the bombing in Kandahar, they have stopped their activities in this area for safety security reasons. The staff has mainly moved to Pakistan. Work with the de-mining programme for the UNO and the UNHCR.	Deal with Afghan Refugees since <b>1985</b> , but only present since <b>1995</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- mainly ECHO, but before events. Re-allocated their function in favour of refugees</li> <li>- small fund from Luxembourg</li> <li>- negotiating subsidies from Belgium and local branch of HCR</li> </ul>

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Organisation	Sector	Speciality	Province	Activities	Present since	Source of funding
HEALTHNET	Basic social services Infrasstructure	- Public Health Care Activities: Health Care Support Project (HCSP)	- Ningarhar	- Through a structure of 12 health centers, a rural hospital of 40 beds and a large network of health volunteers (VHVs) and TBAs, the project provides health care to 382,000. - curative, preventive and promotion health services -community based activities at the village level - Women and children are main targets - Introduction of concept of peripheral health management structure + strategies of community involvement and cost sharing to ensure the sustainability. - Multi-sectoral collaboration with other organizations, to promotes + facilitate the development of project area.		- EC
		- Support of Obstetrics and Gynecology Services	- Eastern region of Afghanistan / Jalabad	- support to Obstetrics and Gynecology unit of the University Hospital in Jalalabad. - Targets women at childbearing age + addresses needs and status of women as beneficiaries as well as providers for medical care.		- Dutch government
		- Support of Pediatrics Services	Eastern Region / Jalalabad	- supporting the Pediatrics unit of the University Hospital in Jalalabad. - Contribution to reduction of very high child mortality in the region - neonatal facility was established to provide the most needed neonatal care for the infants and to establish Afghan neonatal expertise		- Dutch government
		- Support to Specialized MOPH units	Jalalabad	- Support to MCH and the Health Information Unit of the MOPH - Strengthening of active role towards the coordination and the control of the relevant activities by local staff.		

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Organisation	Sector	Speciality	Province	Activities	Present since	Source of funding
<b>HELP</b>	Basic social services	- Education	Badghis Herat	- Girl Schools (10000 pupils) - School feeding for 2 month period		- German Foreign Ministry - DFID - UNICEF
<b>HILFSWERK Austria</b>	Emergency relief Food security	- Humanitarian Aid - Rehabilitation - Agricultural inputs - Job creation and training for women				
<b>INTERSOS</b>	Food security Basic social services	- Emergency relief - Basic social services - Mine clearance	Konar	- Non food items distribution		
			Kabul, Konar (Jalalabad), Nangahar (rural areas)	- Urgent rehabilitations in health and water sectors in rural areas		
			Kabul district	- Mine clearance		
			Faryab and Balkh	Complementary food distribution		
			Faryab (Pakistan)	- Education		
<b>Kerkinactie / ACT Netherlands</b>	Infrastructure Food security	- Support to Integrated Agricultural Development - Water supply and sanitation through DACAAR (Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees) - Support to local NGOs in Western Afghanistan through Christian Aid Heart.				

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Organisation	Sector	Speciality	Province	Activities	Present since	Source of funding
<b>MADERA</b>	Emergency relief Infrastructure Food Security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Agriculture rural rehab (seeds)</li> <li>- Irrigation, road construction</li> <li>- Vaccinations (animals)</li> <li>- Food aid (ffw)</li> <li>- Forestry</li> </ul>	Nangarhar  Jalalabad  Laghman  Nuristan Konar Hazarajat - (Wardak) Kabul Ghor		1988	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- EC (70%)</li> <li>- French Government (15%)</li> <li>- UN-WFP/FAO (15%)</li> </ul>
<b>MDM France</b>	Basic social services Infrastructure	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Health</li> <li>- Basic social services (Medical and Sanitary issues)</li> </ul>	Mainly Kabul and <b>Herat.</b>	Warrant of a street presence (nutrition and primary cares); rehabilitation of the clinics; extended support to other PME (?said in French: PMI) that are not supported by any NGOs	1982	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Contracts with ECHO -got 3 subsidies since June 2000, the last one finished at the end of September 2001.</li> <li>- Contracts with Echo and French government for complements.</li> <li>- Swiss cooperation</li> </ul>
<b>MDM Spain</b>	Emergency relief Basic social services Infrastructure		Nimrooz Samangan Ghor  Heart (town)  Kabul Kandahar (Metropolitan area)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Emergency health care</li> <li>- Construction of small referral hospital</li> <li>- Rehabilitation of hospital and health centers, training</li> <li>- Supplementary food centre support</li> <li>- Access to primary health care and Creation of 80 first aid units in Maslakh camp</li> <li>- Running of mother and child clinics</li> <li>- Mother and child health</li> </ul>	1994	

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Organisation	Sector	Speciality	Province	Activities	Present since	Source of funding
<b>MISSION EAST</b>	Emergency relief Food security Basic social services	- Food Aid - Agriculture - Water and sanitation.	North East Taloqan	- Feeding programme in Northern Afghanistan for some 18,000 beneficiaries for a period of three months with funding from the - Assisting vulnerable households living in the ex-front line villages northeast of Taloqan through the distribution of complementary food items such as vegetable oil, beans, sugar, iodised salt and rice. - seeking funding for the implementation of projects in the sectors of agriculture and watsan.	Plans to extend work in Tjikistan to Afghanistan since early 2001., December 2001:	- Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
<b>MPDL</b>	Emergency relief	- Emergency relief	Faryab	- Disease prevention (malaria, typhus, tuberculosis and leishmaniasis).		
<b>NOVIB/CHA</b>	Emergency relief Infrastructure Basic social services Food Security	- Basic social services: health, education, sanitation - Human rights - Peace building - Women - Mine clearance and awareness - Training - Integrated rural development - Planned: - Development - Rehabilitation	(All but Badakhshan) Ghor Badghis Herat Farah Helmand Kandahar Kabul Logar Parwan Kapisa Balkh Faryab Nangarhar Laghman Jawzjan Takhar	- Training: primary, vocational , university education - IRD: health/education, economic activities, cottage industry  - Comprehensive programme for drought mitigation and rehabilitation with various activities in different sectors	1988	- EC (25%) - Dutch Government (60%) - Own funds (15%)

\* Please note that this table provides only a broad overview of recent and ongoing work of certain European NGOs (as collected by mid February 2002). It cannot therefore be interpreted as comprehensive or representative of all NGO activities.

Organisation	Sector	Speciality	Province	Activities	Present since	Source of funding
<b>OCKENDEN</b>	Emergency relief Food security Basic social services	Issues of displacement including: - Community development; - Economic regeneration; - Education; - Shelter.	Badghis	- Drought relief and humanitarian aid	1995	- ECHO - DFID - Private sources - DFID
			Herat	- Seed distribution		
			Nimroz	- Education (refurbishment, equipment and teacher training)		- DFID - DFID - Private Sources - Private sources - Outstanding proposals to EU B7-302
			Ghazni	- Economic Regeneration - Community development  - Drought relief via FFW and FOODAC in drought effected areas		
<b>OXFAM UK</b>	Emergency relief Basic social services Food Security	- Emergency relief - Education - Agriculture and natural resources - Health	Badakhshan Zabul Kandahar Herat Ghor Badghis	- Food distribution for displaced and drought affected (except NW) - Education programme in Central highlands - Agriculture based activities as part of livelihoods programmes: distribution of seeds and food for livestock (currently suspended) - Small community health programme in Northeast	Since 1989 Office since 1992	- EC - DFID - (emergency distribution done under WFP)
<b>SAVE THE CHILDREN UK</b>	Basic social services	- Health	Sar-I-Pol Balkh  Kandahar	- Health care programmes with mobile clinics and medicine distribution - Small food distribution program	Since 1976 Office since Oct. 2001	- ECHO
<b>SOLIDARITE S</b>	Food security	- Food Security - Agriculture	Wardak Bamiyan			

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Organisation	Sector	Speciality	Province	Activities	Present since	Source of funding
<b>SWEDISH COMMITTEE FOR AFGHANISTAN</b>	Emergency relief Infrastructure Basic social services Food Security	- Agriculture and Food Security - Health - Education	19 provinces of north and east	- Agricultural extension - Multiplication of major crops - Seed testing - Primary health care - Primary education, rehabilitation of schools	1982	- Individual donors in Sweden - SIDA - Forum Syd - EuropeAid - ECHO - UN - World Bank - Own funds
<b>TEAR FUNDUK</b>	Emergency relief Basic social services Food Security	- Emergency Relief  - Water and sanitation - Health - Education - Community development - Environment	Kabul, Parwan, Kapisa, Nangarhar and Laghman, Takhar, Badakshan Balkh,  Kabul, Eastern provinces  Kabul Balk Nangarhar, Kabul	Partner-led operations: - Food and non-food assistance to IDPs; winter relief for disabled; food for work; drought relief  - Well drilling - Health worker training, soap distribution , support to disabled (hearing + visually impaired);  - Forestry/ Horticulture; Appropriate solar technology	1971 by supporting partners October 2001	- UNHCR (for disaster response team)  - Private donors - DFID
<b>TROCAIRE</b>	Emergency relief Basic social services Food Security	- Emergency relief  Planned: - Health - Agriculture(Livelihood support)	Kabul, Ghazni Western provinces, Kandahar  Kabul city	- support to IDPs through distribution of food, shelter medicine;  - emergency primary health care - revitalization of agricultural cooperatives; village microprojects		- Ireland Aid - Own funds - Caritas
<b>UMCOR</b>	Emergency relief	- Emergencies Relief -	Takhar	- Distribution of winterized shelter kits and non-food items (no office in Afghanistan but collaborating with Mercy Corps, Taloqan. Assessment mission planned)	Operating Tajikistan. in Afghanistan since Nov. 2001	- ACT International with in-kind contributions from Mercy Corps

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Organisation	Sector	Speciality	Province	Activities	Present since	Source of funding
<b>WORLD VISION UK</b>	Emergency relief Food Security	- Food Security  - Emergency relief  Planned: - supplementary feeding	Ghor, Herath, Farah, Badghis  South/Central and near Tajik border in North	- Food for work; agriculture; irrigation; possibly livestock (focus on reintegration of IDPs and drought affected areas) - No-food item distribution - Supplementary feeding in Badghis, Ghor and Herat	Late 1080s – early 90s  Re-started Oct. 2001	
<b>ZOA (Zoa Refugee Care Netherlands)</b>	Emergency relief Basic social services Food Security	- Emergency relief - Health - Agriculture and natural resources	Greater Kabul Mazar-I-sharif		2000	- Dorkas - WFP - CRW RC (Canada) - Own funds

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## 7.2. LIST OF SEMINAR PARTICIPANTS

### AFGHANISTAN SEMINAR, FEBRUARY 14, 2002 PARTICIPANTS LIST

NAME	FUNCTION	ORGANISATION	E-MAIL ADDRESS
<b>GONNET Thomas</b>	<b>Desk Officer</b>	<b>ACF</b>	<a href="mailto:Tg@acf.imagnet.fr">Tg@acf.imagnet.fr</a> <a href="mailto:Secretar@acf.imagnet.fr">Secretar@acf.imagnet.fr</a>
<b>CALEY Marie-Pierre</b>	<b>Director</b>	<b>ACTED</b>	<a href="mailto:Marie-pierre.caley@acted.org">Marie-pierre.caley@acted.org</a>
<b>AUGIER Justine</b>			
<b>ROUSSEL Frédéric</b>	<b>Field</b>		
<b>DESCHOENMAEKER Eric</b>			
<b>MAYCOCK Joanna</b>	<b>EU liaison Officer</b>	<b>ACTIONAID Alliance</b>	<a href="mailto:jmaycock@actionaidalliance.org">jmaycock@actionaidalliance.org</a>
<b>PETRACEK Thomas</b>	<b>Desk Officer for Humanitarian Aid</b>	<b>ADRA</b>	<a href="mailto:Adra_pere@t-online.de">Adra_pere@t-online.de</a> <a href="mailto:Adra_petracek@t-online.de">Adra_petracek@t-online.de</a> <a href="mailto:Jameshepley@web.de">Jameshepley@web.de</a>
<b>SHEPLEY James</b>	<b>Desk Officer for Development Department</b>		
<b>WINTER Elizabeth</b>	<b>Special Adviser</b>	<b>AFGHANAID (British Agencies Afghanistan Group)</b>	<a href="mailto:Elizabeth.winter@baag.org.uk">Elizabeth.winter@baag.org.uk</a>
<b>HILTON Eliza</b>	<b>Programme Grants Management</b>	<b>AGA KHAN Foundation UK</b>	<a href="mailto:Eliza.Hilton@akf.org.uk">Eliza.Hilton@akf.org.uk</a>
<b>SANDBRINK Stefan</b>	<b>Head of Foreign Aid Department</b>	<b>ASB</b>	<a href="mailto:s.sandbrink@asb-online.de">s.sandbrink@asb-online.de</a>
<b>MARSDEN Peter</b>	<b>Information Coordinator</b>	<b>British Agencies Afghanistan Group</b>	<a href="mailto:Peter.marsden@refugeecouncil.org.uk">Peter.marsden@refugeecouncil.org.uk</a>
<b>SELLIER Barbara</b>	<b>Brussels Representative</b>	<b>CAD (Children's Aid Direct)</b>	<a href="mailto:Cad.barbarasellier@yucom.be">Cad.barbarasellier@yucom.be</a>

<b>ALDRED Tim</b>	<b>Head of Emergencies</b>	<b>CAFOD</b>	<a href="mailto:Hqcafod@cafod.org.uk">Hqcafod@cafod.org.uk</a>
<b>PEREIRA Marsha</b>	<b>Emergency Support Section</b>		
<b>MALARDEAU Carine</b>		<b>CARE International</b>	<a href="mailto:carine.malardeau@care-international.org">carine.malardeau@care-international.org</a>
<b>BORSBOOM Paul</b>		<b>CARE NED</b>	<a href="mailto:paul.borsboom@care nederland.org">paul.borsboom@care nederland.org</a>
<b>WALLMEIER Edith</b>	<b>Emergency co-ordinator</b>	<b>CARE Germany</b>	<a href="mailto:wallmeier@care.de">wallmeier@care.de</a>
<b>DE WOLF Will</b>	<b>Manager International Co-operation</b>	<b>CARITAS EUROPA</b>	<a href="mailto:Wdewolf@caritas-europa.org">Wdewolf@caritas-europa.org</a>
<b>HAYWARD Robert</b>	<b>Programme Funding Officer</b>	<b>CHRISTIAN AID</b>	<a href="mailto:Rhayward@christian-aid.org">Rhayward@christian-aid.org</a>
<b>BERMEJO Cristina</b>	<b>Coordinator for the International Project</b>	<b>CIR</b>	<a href="mailto:Cir@ongrescate.org">Cir@ongrescate.org</a>
<b>FALCITELLI Gianluca</b>	<b>Contacts with Afghan NGOs</b>	<b>CISP</b>	<a href="mailto:cisp.pro@flashnet.it">cisp.pro@flashnet.it</a> <a href="mailto:cisp.pro@cisp-ngo.org">cisp.pro@cisp-ngo.org</a> <a href="mailto:cisp.bxl@euronet.be">cisp.bxl@euronet.be</a>
<b>SOLARI Giovanna</b>	<b>Representative in Brussels</b>		
<b>PUTINJA Isabel</b>	<b>Policy Assistant</b>	<b>CLONG</b>	<a href="mailto:Sec@clong.be">Sec@clong.be</a>
<b>BIANCHI Lorenzo</b>	<b>Liason Officer</b>	<b>COOPI</b>	<a href="mailto:Martina@coopi.org">Martina@coopi.org</a> <a href="mailto:bruxelles@coopi.org">bruxelles@coopi.org</a>
<b>PIELS Wim</b>		<b>CORDAID</b>	<a href="mailto:wim.piels@cordaid.nl">wim.piels@cordaid.nl</a>

<b>ANDREASEN Sten</b>	<b>DACAAR Programme Co- ordinator</b>	<b>DACAAR / DRC</b>	<a href="mailto:dacaar@pes.comsats.net.pk">dacaar@pes.comsats.net.pk</a> <a href="mailto:drc@drc.dk">drc@drc.dk</a> <a href="mailto:sten.andreassen@drc.dk">sten.andreassen@drc.dk</a>
<b>DUIVES Gert-Jan</b>	<b>Board Member Former Project Director Pakistan/Afghanistan (88-90)</b>	<b>DCA</b>	<a href="mailto:b.e.c.schreuder@id.dlo.nl">b.e.c.schreuder@id.dlo.nl</a> <a href="mailto:g.j.duives@wxs.nl">g.j.duives@wxs.nl</a> <a href="mailto:b.e.c.schreuder@id.wag-ur.nl">b.e.c.schreuder@id.wag-ur.nl</a>
<b>RUEFFER Hubertus</b>	<b>Programme Officer</b>	<b>DWHH (Deutsche WeltHungerHilfe)/ German AgroAction</b>	<a href="mailto:Hubertus.rueffer@dwhh.de">Hubertus.rueffer@dwhh.de</a> <a href="mailto:Annette.wulf@dwhh.de">Annette.wulf@dwhh.de</a>
<b>WULF Annette</b>			
<b>WHITE Diana</b>	<b>EU-CORD Brussels Representative</b>	<b>EU-CORD</b>	<a href="mailto:Diana.white@skynet.be">Diana.white@skynet.be</a>
<b>MICHEL Jean-François</b>	<b>Desk Officer for Afghanistan</b>	<b>HANDICAP International</b>	<a href="mailto:Jean-francois.michel@handicap.be">Jean-francois.michel@handicap.be</a> <a href="mailto:Laurence.gerard@handicap.be">Laurence.gerard@handicap.be</a>
<b>ENGELMANN Berthold</b>	<b>Afghanistan Coordinator</b>	<b>HELP</b>	<a href="mailto:help-ev.schulze@t-online.de">help-ev.schulze@t-online.de</a> <a href="mailto:help-ev@t-online.de">help-ev@t-online.de</a>
<b>BURKHART Heidi</b>	<b>Managing director</b>	<b>Hilfswerk Austria</b>	<a href="mailto:Burkhart@austria.hilfswerk.at">Burkhart@austria.hilfswerk.at</a> <a href="mailto:Office@austria.hilfswerk.at">Office@austria.hilfswerk.at</a>
<b>GEURTS Marlou</b>	<b>Project Management Assistant</b>	<b>HNI (HealthNet International)</b>	<a href="mailto:Marlou@hni.nl">Marlou@hni.nl</a>
<b>ROELANDS Chiel</b>	<b>Programme Officer Backdonor Desk</b>	<b>ICCO</b>	<a href="mailto:CR@icco.nl">CR@icco.nl</a> <a href="mailto:ADMIN@ICCO.NL">ADMIN@ICCO.NL</a>
<b>SERGI Nino</b>	<b>Secretary General</b>	<b>INTERSOS</b>	<a href="mailto:Gianni.rufini@intersos.org">Gianni.rufini@intersos.org</a> <a href="mailto:Interosos@intersos.org">Interosos@intersos.org</a>
<b>CALABRETTA Stefano</b>	<b>Land mines specialist</b>		
<b>BERNARDUS Raymond</b>	<b>Programme Officer Emergencies Asia</b>	<b>Kerkinactie / ACT Netherlands</b>	<a href="mailto:r.bernardus@kerkinactie.nl">r.bernardus@kerkinactie.nl</a> <a href="mailto:e.va.bodegom@kerkinactie.nl">e.va.bodegom@kerkinactie.nl</a>

<b>CAPOZZI Donato</b>	<b>Projects director</b>	<b>MDM</b>	<a href="mailto:Mdm.dtor-proyect@apdo.com">Mdm.dtor-proyect@apdo.com</a>
<b>DYER Ruth</b>	<b>Programme Officer Tajikistan Afghanistan</b>	<b>Mission East</b>	<a href="mailto:Ruth.dyer@miseast.org">Ruth.dyer@miseast.org</a>
<b>PRATESI Carla</b>	<b>Representative in Brussels</b>	<b>MOVIMONDO</b>	<a href="mailto:Movimondo@euronet.be">Movimondo@euronet.be</a>
<b>FERNANDEZ Amaya</b>	<b>Coordinator at interim</b>	<b>MPDL</b>	<a href="mailto:Mpdl.brux@beon.be">Mpdl.brux@beon.be</a>
<b>JOOLEN Marc</b>	<b>Regional Operations Co-ordinator</b>	<b>MSF</b>	<a href="mailto:Marc.joolen@msf.be">Marc.joolen@msf.be</a> <a href="mailto:Christopher.stokes@msf.be">Christopher.stokes@msf.be</a>
<b>BEALE James</b>		<b>OCKENDEN</b>	<a href="mailto:Cc@ockenden.org.uk">Cc@ockenden.org.uk</a>
<b>VAN DER TAS Jurjen</b>	<b>Coordinator Institutional Funding Unit</b>	<b>OXFAM / NOVIB</b>	<a href="mailto:jurjen.van.der.tas@novib.nl">jurjen.van.der.tas@novib.nl</a>
<b>VAN MIERLO Jos</b>	<b>Programme Officer Afghanistan</b>		<a href="mailto:jos.van.mierlo@novib.nl">jos.van.mierlo@novib.nl</a>
<b>ATTINGER Rémi</b>	<b>Director of Development</b>	<b>PREMIERE URGENCE</b>	<a href="mailto:Rattinger@premiere-urgence.org">Rattinger@premiere-urgence.org</a>
<b>VILIANI Francesca</b>		<b>SOLIDAR</b>	<a href="mailto:francesca@solidar.org">francesca@solidar.org</a>
<b>WILSON Clare H.</b>	<b>NGO Representative</b>	<b>SOLIDARITÉ AFGHANISTAN BELGIUM (SAB)</b>	<a href="mailto:Solafgh@cybernet.be">Solafgh@cybernet.be</a>



<b>DUCKERING Mike</b>	<b>International Donor Relations Officer</b>	<b>TEAR FUND UK</b>	<a href="mailto:Mike.duckering@tearfund.org">Mike.duckering@tearfund.org</a>
<b>PARATA Salvatore</b>	<b>Advocacy Officer, EU level</b>	<b>TERRE DES HOMMES</b>	<a href="mailto:brussels@iftdh.org">brussels@iftdh.org</a>
<b>COUGHLIN John</b>	<b>Co-financing Officer</b>	<b>TROCAIRE</b>	<a href="mailto:Coughlin@trocaire.ie">Coughlin@trocaire.ie</a>
<b>GRUNEWALD François</b>		<b>Groupe URD</b>	
<b>HARRIS Debs</b>	<b>WV UK Programme Officer</b>	<b>World Vision</b>	<a href="mailto:debs_harris@wvi.org">debs_harris@wvi.org</a>
<b>BACKHURST Jane</b>	<b>WV EU Liaison Office Director</b>		<a href="mailto:Jane_backhurst@wvi.org">Jane_backhurst@wvi.org</a>
<b>CORNARO Markus</b>	<b>Head of Unit Afghanistan, Pakistan</b>	<b>European Commission DG RELEX</b>	<a href="mailto:markus.cornaro@cec.eu.int">markus.cornaro@cec.eu.int</a>
<b>DUDERMEL Thierry</b>	<b>Desk Environment Social Development</b>	<b>European Commission AIDCO</b>	<a href="mailto:Thierry.dudermel@cec.eu.int">Thierry.dudermel@cec.eu.int</a>
<b>FERRANDES Fabrice</b>	<b>Administrator at Food Security Unit</b>	<b>European Commission</b>	<a href="mailto:Fabrice.ferrandes@cec.eu.int">Fabrice.ferrandes@cec.eu.int</a>
<b>GILBERT James</b>	<b>Desk Officer Afghanistan</b>	<b>European Commission DG RELEX</b>	<a href="mailto:James.gilbert@cec.eu.int">James.gilbert@cec.eu.int</a>
<b>HEBBERECHT Chantal</b>	<b>Head of Unit Food Security</b>	<b>European Commission AIDCO</b>	<a href="mailto:chantal.hebberecht@cec.eu.int">chantal.hebberecht@cec.eu.int</a>
<b>JONCKERS Jos</b>	<b>Principal Administrator Social development Unit Asia</b>	<b>European Commission AIDCO</b>	<a href="mailto:Jos.jonckers@cec.eu.int">Jos.jonckers@cec.eu.int</a>
<b>KIRK Anthony</b>	<b>Head of Unit Social development Unit Asia</b>	<b>European Commission AIDCO</b>	<a href="mailto:Anthony.kirk@cec.eu.int">Anthony.kirk@cec.eu.int</a>

<b>NIEL Patrick</b>	<b>ECHO 3 Assistant</b>	<b>European Commission ECHO</b>	<a href="mailto:Patrick.niel@cec.eu.int">Patrick.niel@cec.eu.int</a>
<b>ROUSSET Elisabeth</b>	<b>ECHO 3 Afghanistan</b>	<b>European Commission ECHO</b>	<a href="mailto:Elisabeth.rousset@cec.eu.int">Elisabeth.rousset@cec.eu.int</a>

<b>EuronAid, VOICE</b>		
<b>CONSULTANT</b>	Mr. Nassim JAWAD	<a href="mailto:n.jawad@compuserve.com">n.jawad@compuserve.com</a>
<b>EURONAID</b>	Ms. Gisella REINA Senior Officer Project Support Team	<a href="mailto:g.reina@euronaid.nl">g.reina@euronaid.nl</a>
<b>EURONAID</b>	Ms. Cécile MULLER Liaison Officer EuronAid Brussels Office	<a href="mailto:c.muller@euronaid.nl">c.muller@euronaid.nl</a>
<b>EURONAID</b>	Ms. Maliana SERRANO Assistant Project Support Unit	<a href="mailto:m.serrano@euronaid.nl">m.serrano@euronaid.nl</a>
<b>EURONAID</b>	Mr. Gerhard SCHMALBRUCH Secretary General	<a href="mailto:g.schmalbruch@euronaid.nl">g.schmalbruch@euronaid.nl</a>
<b>EURONAID</b>	Mr. Richard Keats WILLIAMSON EuronAid Representative Afghanistan	<a href="mailto:r.williamson@euronaid.nl">r.williamson@euronaid.nl</a>
<b>VOICE</b>	Ms. Kathrin SCHICK Director	<a href="mailto:kathrin@ngovoice.org">kathrin@ngovoice.org</a>
<b>VOICE</b>	MR. Tim ALCHIN Information Officer	<a href="mailto:information@ngovoice.org">information@ngovoice.org</a>
<b>VOICE</b>	Ms. Asja HADZIMUSIC Administration Officer	<a href="mailto:administration@ngovoice.org">administration@ngovoice.org</a>
<b>VOICE</b>	Mr. Federico ARGENTINO	<a href="mailto:federico@ngovoice.org">federico@ngovoice.org</a>